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Aspiring to become a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) the Vietnamese 
government is confronted with tremendous political, e conomic and institutional 
challenges. Issues to be addressed are not only technical questions such as the tariff 
regime, industrial and agricultural subsidies, market access for foreign service 
providers, and the protection of intellectual property rights. More far-reaching will be 
the consequences of the reform and modernization of the legal system, the privatization 
of state-owned e nterprises as well as a new approach towards taxation and the 
strengthening of fiscal authorities. In order to ensure a result of bilateral and multilateral 
negotiations which is beneficial for the country’s legitimate development interests, 
numerous economic and political stakeholders on central and provincial level have to be 
consulted and must cooperate in a well coordinated manner.  
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1  Introduction  
The recently started new round of global trade liberation talks (Doha Round), China’s 
accession to the WTO, the ratification of the Bilateral Trade Agreement (BTA) with the 
US, the tightening schedule for implementing existing commitments under ASEAN’s 
Free Trade Area Agreement (AFTA) and not least Hanoi’s new cabinet line-up have 
given Vietnam’s WTO ambitions new impetus. Achieving WTO membership is now – 
as recently appointed Deputy Prime Minister Vu Khoan confirmed – of top priority for 
the new government.1 
Based on the Politburo’s decision 07/NQ-TW on international economic integration2 
the Government has started to think about a comprehensive “roadmap” for scheduling 
and advancing WTO accession. Since it is common knowledge that approximately half 
of the time scheduled for negotiations is devoted to preparations and planning, this draft 
paper attempts to provide some additional input which could enrich and complement the 
internal debate among Vietnamese stakeholders.  
Trade policy should be an integral part of any comprehensive development framework. 
It seeks to ensure that trade policy priorities are set in accordance with the country’s 
development stage and that it is consistent with the exchange rate policy, the legal 
system, the  foreign direct investment regime, labor and competition practices, the 
banking system, administrative realities etc. Moreover, comprehensive tax reform3 is an 
essential precondition for wide-ranging tariff cuts and helps to avoid fiscal instability. 
If trade is to continue to serve as an engine of growth, Vietnam must develop a 
multidimensional strategy for trade expansion, which fits into an appropriate 
macroeconomic environment. Institutional reforms and improvements in the legal 
system are as important as human resource development and appropriate infrastructure 
for attracting FDI and expanding overseas markets.  
                                                 
1 Interview with DPM Vu Khoan in Vietnam Investment Review, (12-18 August 2002). See 
http://www.vir.com.vn/virwebsite/Output/565vir/565new00.htm  
2 The resolution of November 2001 emphasizes that “the Party will step up Vietnam’s integration efforts 
by harnessing all internal strengths and resources”. 
3 By broadening the tax base and reducing tax evasion and avoidance.   5 
This ambitious national agenda requires a vision of how Vietnam will continue the 
integration and globalization process in a way that sustains human development.4 The 
priorities Vietnam accords to trade must receive full internal support and should come 
about through a national dialogue over development priorities and appropriate 
responses.5 The outcome of this process will be a broad vision, which is far more 
comprehensive than the roadmap for WTO accession sketched here, and where 
structural and social objectives should be treated simultaneously with macroeconomic 
and financial concerns.6 
The present report is structured along the WTO agreements but includes several issues 
that go well beyond the trade agenda. It is an attempt to address in a straight and fairly 
comprehensive way the key issues of WTO accession without neglecting the 
development dimension of trade liberalization.  
Last but not least I would like to express my sincere gratitude for the invaluable support 
I received from two distinguished trade professionals, Mr. Arthur Dunkel7 and Mr. 
Klaus Kautzor-Schroeder8 who provided me with valuable details about the usual 
procedure of bilateral market access negotiations.  
                                                 
4 For elucidating the relation between trade and poverty see McCulloch, Neil, Winters, Alan L. & Cirera, 
Xavier: Trade Liberalization and Poverty – A Handbook. CEPR / DFID Publication, London 2001.  
5 The documents resulting from last year’s CP congress are an excellent basis and contain many profound 
and guiding ideas. However, one flaw is that their formulation has lacked significant contributions 
from the (private) enterprise sector. Without considering the interests and views of this nascent and 
still to be unleashed sector, it seems less likely that Vietnam will fully realize its growth and export 
potential. 
6 However, the WTO accession of Vietnam remains a complicated and tedious issue. First and foremost 
because some privileged groups that have appropriated monopoly rents arising from the lack of 
transparency and from the manifold restrictions to the free flow of goods are still opposing the 
obligations arising from full WTO membership (i.e. transparency, predictability, rule of law etc.). 
Thus, without consensus at the inner circle of the government (including the Politburo) to advance 
accession preparations, the benefits of membership to Vietnam as a whole will not materialize easily. 
7 Mr. Arthur Dunkel held the position of Director-General of the General Agreements on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) from January 1980 to June 1993. He advises the Government of Vietnam in the context 
of its accession process to the WTO since 1996. 
8 Mr. Klaus Kautzor-Schroeder is a former director in the GATT/WTO Secretariat in Geneva. He was 
heavily involved in the Tokyo and Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations. Before joining 
the GATT in 1972, he worked for twelve years in the Foreign Trade Department of the Federal 
Ministry of Economy in Bonn, Germany.  
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2  Vietnam’s accession to the WTO 
Vietnam submitted its application for WTO membership9 in 1995 and so has started the 
tedious process of negotiating the conditions of accession. The Working Party (WP) 
was established by 30 M ay 1995 and 15 months later Vietnam handed over the 
“Memorandum on Foreign Trade Policy” to the WTO. In return, Vietnam has received a 
list of – up to now - more than 1700 questions, which aim at clarifying further details of 
current Vietnamese economic, administrative and legal practices. Moreover, five WP 
meetings have contributed to create a higher degree of transparency of Vietnam’s 
foreign trade regime, thus concluding the so-called “information gathering phase”. A 
pioneering bilateral trade agreement with the US was signed in 2000 after three years of 
negotiations. Ratification by both Parliaments took, however, until December 2001. 
Initial offers for goods and for services have been submitted to the members of the 
Working Party in 2002, followed by requests of several WTO members to start 
individually bilateral negotiations.  The 6
th meeting of the Working Party is scheduled 
for spring 2003.  
Despite the fact that Vietnam seeks full WTO membership because of it’s inherent 
advantages, the country wants to negotiate the terms of accession in a way that may be 
difficult to maintain, judging from the experiences of some recently joined WTO 
members. Moreover, since there is the fear that a swift WTO accession might have 
long-term negative effects on Vietnam’s development prospects, not only the 
Communist Party acts with some restraint. Ambivalence is evident in other 
governmental i nstitutions, too. Most of the Vietnamese ministries have not reached 
internal consensus about conditions, the time frame and administrative implications of 
the expected WTO membership.  
                                                 
9 Actually, Vietnam submitted an application to become GATT ’47 member in June 1994 and was 
granted observer status thereafter. When WTO became operational (1.1.95), Vietnam forwarded a 
second request to join the organization.   7 
The WTO Accession Process  
Any state or customs territory having full autonomy in the conduct of its trade policies may join the 
WTO, but WTO members must agree on the terms. Therefore, accession to the WTO is essentially a 
process of negotiation —quite different from the process of a ccession to other international entities. 
Broadly speaking, accession goes through four stages:  
Fact-finding / Information-gathering: The government applying for membership has to describe all 
aspects of its trade and economic policies that have a bearing on WTO agreements. This information is 
submitted to the WTO in a Memorandum that is examined by the Working Party dealing with the 
country’s application. At the initial meeting of the Working Party, members examine previously 
submitted questions and answers to study the conformity of the Applicant's trade regime with the various 
requirements of the WTO Agreements. In subsequent Working Party Meetings, additional questions in 
writing, responses, and further information papers are exchanged.  
Negotiation Phase: When the Working Party has made sufficient progress on principles and policies, 
parallel bilateral talks begin between the prospective new member and individual countries. They are 
bilateral because different countries have different trading interests. These talks cover tariff rates, specific 
market access commitments, and other policies in goods and services. The new member’s commitments 
must apply equally to all WTO members under normal non-discrimination rules, even though they are 
negotiated bilaterally. In other words, the talks determine the concessions other WTO members can 
expect when the new member joins.  
Protocol of Accession: The summary of the discussions in the Working Party is contained in a Report of 
the Working Party. In addition, Schedules of Concessions and Commitments on Goods and of Specific 
Commitments on Services are prepared. These three documents are annexed to the so-called Protocol of 
Accession, which includes the terms of accession agreed by the Applicant and members of the Working 
Party.  
Membership: All documents elaborated by the Working Party are presented to the WTO General 
Council or the Ministerial Conference. If a two-thirds majority of WTO members vote in favour, the 
applicant is free to sign the protocol and to accede to the organisation.  
Compiled from WTO’s Training Package and the WTO Guide „Trading into the Future“.  For a 
comprehensive description of the accession process, see WTO: Technical Note on the Accession Process, 




Vietnam’s WTO accession is further constrained by some other obstacles, which are 
common to acceding WTO member countries. They can be summarized under the three 
“C’s”, namely (1) coherence, (2) communication and (3) coordination. The difficulties 
are: 
•  Deficits in implementing the legislative framework because of inadequate 
administrative structures, 
•  Limited knowledge of the requirements for formulating WTO-consistent laws 
and regulations, 
•  Conflicts among domestic ministries and their subordinate units, and a general 
lack of willingness by “participating” institutions and organizations to freely 
discuss their tasks, functions, structure, etc. 
•  Particularism and obstruction by administrative authorities at provincial level, 
which bypass WTO-consistent provisions of the central government by 
divergent own decision. 
In order to facilitate interaction among public entities, in 1998 the Vietnamese 
government set up a "National Committee for International Economic Cooperation" 
(NCIEC). The primary task of the NCIEC is “to assist the Prime Minister in supplying 
concrete guidance and coordinating activities of Ministries and local governments in 
Vietnam’s participation in trade-economic activities within ASEAN,  ASEM, APEC; 
and in negotiating to access and participate in WTO and other international, regional 
trade-economic organizations.“ 
As a coordinating and advisory body, the NCIEC is located between the Prime 
Minister’s Office and the ministries. It is chaired by a Deputy Prime Minister. Each of 
the 20 member ministries is represented by a Vice minister. Representative(s) of the 
Communist Party’s Economic Commission attend the meetings, too. The Minister of 
Trade is Vice Chairman.  
Since Vietnam signaled during the IX
th Party Congress in April 2001 its willingness to 
continue the country’s integration into the global economic community, the demand for 
WTO-related interaction between ministries, public and business entities will further 
increase. Thus, the government has started to draw a comprehensive “roadmap” for the   9 
country’s accession to the global trade body that goes much beyond conventional trade 
subjects. The report in hand comments in a very comprehensive way on issues to be 
tackled and provides ideas how to overcome the slow progress in some sensitive areas 
of economic and institutional reform. 
 
 
3  Trade in Goods  
Key issues in accession negotiations for trade in goods are: tariffs for agricultural and 
industrial products, domestic support and export subsidies, and non-tariff barriers such 
as quantitative restrictions and import licensing requirements. Based on the information 
provided by the applicant as well as by referring to the “initial offer”10 Working Party 
members negotiate bilaterally11 market access conditions and discuss obligations for 
bringing the trade regime in the goods section into compliance with WTO provisions. 
Of general interest for the established WTO members is the import-weighted average  
                                                 
10 At a certain point of the accession process, normally when the fact-finding phase is close to an end and 
most of the questions raised by WTO members have been answered, the applicant submits its so called 
“initial offer” in goods. The goods schedule comprises the tariff concessions and agricultural 
commitments made by the acceding government. Part I of the schedule contains most-favored-nation 
tariff concessions (i.e. the legally binding undertaking by the prospective member not to raise or levy 
customs duties above a specified level) for agricultural as well as industrial products. Part II focuses on 
any preferential tariff concessions; Part III encloses any non-tariff concessions and Part IV contains 
commitments limiting the subsidization of agricultural products (domestic support as well as export 
subsidies). 
11 Negotiations on tariffs are conducted bilaterally, because concessions on specific tariff lines are of 
different importance to individual members. Here, individual WTO members negotiate for concessions 
that benefit their main export industries. The “Quad” (US, EU, Japan & Canada) is interested in far 
reaching concessions for a wide range of agricultural and industrial products, whereas smaller 
economies prefer to negotiate on narrower product groups. New Zealand focuses, for instance, on meat 
and diary products, Cuba on Rum and Cigars, Colombia on fresh cut flowers and coffee, Switzerland 
on wristwatches etc. Being aware of these national negotiation interests helps the applicant to prepare 
for the bilateral market access negotiations.  
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tariff level12, the dispersion of tariff rates across products13, the number of zero-rated 
products14, and, at least in theory, the number of tariff lines for which rates are not to be 
bound.15  
Currently Vietnam is administering three categories of import duties: (1) normal rates, 
(2) preferential rates and (3) special preferential rates.16 Special preferential rate are 
applied u nder AFTA/CEPT, i.e. customs unions and/or free trade areas. Preferential 
rates are employed for imported goods originating in countries which grant reciprocal 
MFN treatment17. Normal rates are relevant to remaining countries and impose a 
surcharge of usually 50 percent to the preferential rate. Additional import duties are 
applied in cases where goods are dumped into the Vietnamese market, i.e. where the 
exporting country subsidizes cross-border transactions.18 A large number of non-tariff 
barriers impede and restrict imports.19 
                                                 
12 The key demand by current WTO members has been that acceding economies bind their tariffs for 
industrial goods at roughly double the average rate for OECD countries, which would imply an import-
weighted average of bound rates of no more than 10 percent (!). However, the tariff bindings offered 
so far by many applicant countries are considerably higher. It seems, however, unlikely that applicants 
will succeed in obtaining agreement for the imposition of higher tariffs. 
13 Reducing dispersed tariff rates and/or tariff peaks, tariffs escalations etc. increases transparency and 
facilitates accession. A good example for a desired “flat-tariff structure” (i.e. where all tariffs rates are 
equal or nearly equal) is Chile (an established GATT ‘47 member!), which in 1997 introduced a tariff 
rate of 11 percent for all imports.  
14 Goods or sectors where applicants are prepared to enter into binding commitments to reduce tariffs to 
zero. The Information Technology Agreement (ITA) is a recent example of this approach and will be 
of particular importance for Vietnam. 
15 However, it is evident from the Protocols of Accession that past entries have seen no (!) unbound tariff 
lines. The number of individually bound tariff items for non-agricultural products are as follows (in 
brackets t he total number of tariff items): Kyrgyz Rep. 6,068 (of 6,068), Latvia: 4,564 (of 4,564), 
Estonia: 5,328 (of 5,328), Jordan 5,896 (of 5,896), Georgia 5,206 (of 5,206), Croatia 6,469 (of 6,469), 
Albania 8,459 (of 8,459), Oman (4,858 (of 4,858). The situation for agricultural products is analogous. 
So negotiating for unbound tariffs seems to be a waste of time and effort for any applicant. 
16 See Law on Import and Export Duties, 30 May 1998. 
17 At present only the US and EU enjoy MFN tariff rates (EU because of the letter of Minister Vu Khoan 
to Trade Commissioner Lamy of 10 October 2000, in which he states that “Vietnam will give 
treatment to the European Union’s firms no less favorable than that to be given to US firms and that 
EU firms will not suffer any discrimination as a result of the Agreement between the Socialist 
Republic of Vietnam and the United States of America.” 
18 Moreover, quantitative restrictions and licensing requirements are applied to the importation of 
specific products by a decision the Prime Ministers issues each year. 
19 A comprehensive stocktaking report on Vietnam’s NTBs (and how to phase them out) was prepared 
by the Centre for International Economics (CIE), in 1999. Pls. refer to the CIEs website for 
downloading: http://www.intecon.com.au/pdf/ 
Vietnam%20NTB%20report-%20version%20for%20Web%20site.PDF.   11 
In order to facilitate accession negotiations, the stakeholders involved should take the 
following action: 
Conduct further studies on the international competitiveness of specific 
industries/sectors: To continue the remarkable economic development Vietnam requires 
high rates of domestic and foreign investment. However, investment should be allocated 
in those sectors, where international competitiveness is given today, can be expected in 
the future, or where Vietnam has – due to its endowment with cheap labor and/or its 
abundance of natural resources - the potential to meet the challenges of integration. As 
this guiding principle was not always taken sufficiently into account during the first 
phase of economic reforms, in-depth studies on the international competitiveness of 
some specific sectors have to be conducted by the actual key players of cross-border 
transactions for better understanding the opportunities and challenges of integration. In 
order to ensure the usefulness and practicability of resulting recommendations, affected 
enterprises or business associations should commission sufficiently experienced local 
consultants for conducting in-depth studies of those export products/sectors which have 
the potential of becoming future engines of economic growth.20 Accordingly, sectors/ 
branches that have enjoyed preferential policies for many years should be thoroughly 
evaluated by teams of proved national experts  and international consultants for 
guaranteeing the validity of results and ensuing policy guidelines. In particular it should 
be assessed whether the progress achieved in productivity growth provides enough basis 
for further protection and continued governmental support, i.e. to reconsider the 
rationale behind preferential policies.  
Sectors/industries of particular interest are21: 
•  Textile / Garments,  
•  Leather / Shoes, 
                                                 
20 It should be examined which supportive and WTO compatible measures have to be taken by the 
government for strengthening the sector’s ability to cope better with the challenges on global markets. 
21 First orientations for some of the listed sectors can be extracted from the report of Dean Spinanger: 
Vietnam’s Industrial Strategy in Light of its WTO Accession Process, Report prepared under UNDP 
Project VIE/95/24, Hanoi May 2000.  
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•  Maritime Products,  
•  Food Processing,  
•  Chemical / Fertilizer,  
•  Electronics / Information Technology, 
•  Electric Equipment,  
•  Automotive (Motorcycle) Industry,  
•  Paper,  
•  Polymer and Rubber Processing,  
•  Dairy Products, 
•  Glass / Porcelain,  
•  Steel-making Industry, 
•  Wood Processing (Furniture), 
•  Shipbuilding industry, 
•  Mining Industry. 
Some recent examples are the reports on the Vietnamese sugar program financed by 
AusAid,22 the “preliminary” analysis of the competitiveness of the agricultural sector, 
prepared by MARD and FAO,23 the EC Multilateral Trade Policy Assistance Project’s 
(MUTRAP) sub-sector studies on IT accessories, steel and diary products, corn and 
artificial wood, as well as the assessment of Vietnam's export potential for seafood and 
footwear conducted under the UNDP / ITC project VIE/98/021.  
However, the usefulness of sectoral or product studies of international competitiveness 
by the government, consultants or international organizations depends very much upon 
who is actually carrying out such surveys to what end! One of the problems is the 
                                                 
22 Centre for International Economics (CIE) & Vietbid: Vietnam Sugar Program. Where Next?, Canberra 
December 2001, http://www.intecon.com.au/pdf/WB,Vietnam%20Sugar.pdf. 
23 MARD & FAO: The competitiveness of the Agricultural Sector of Vietnam. A Preliminary Analysis 
in the Context of ASEAN and AFTA, Hanoi October 2000.   13 
difficulty to acquire knowledge concerning standards, tastes and preferences of 
consumers/end-users in target markets. Another is the danger of special interests 
influencing the conduct and outcome of the studies. Furthermore, in a rapidly 
developing economy comparative advantage (which ought to be the foundation of 
international competitiveness) is likely to change over time in a fashion only difficult to 
predict. Therefore international trade authorities tend to advocate a “neutral” trade 
policy regime that emphasizes equal treatment of all sectors and focuses on removing 
trade impediments (including export barriers) generated by domestic policies. The final 
responsibility for the evaluation of actual and potential competitiveness should then 
reside with individual domestic investors (whether private or corporatized government 
enterprises).24 
Reconsider tariff lines:  High tariffs are applied for those goods with considerable 
domestic production (up to 100 percent for passenger cars with up to 10 seats) while 
more than half of all tariff lines tax imports very moderately between 0 and 5 percent. 
Thus, a simple average approach to Vietnam’s tariff regime disguises the true extend of 
protecting domestic industries.25 Not surprisingly the WTO members perceived 
Vietnam's initial offer for goods submitted in December  2001 as “insufficient”. 
Consequently, during bilateral negotiations VN will experience massive pressure to cut 
the highest tariffs to rates at least similar to commitments under AFTA/CEPT (target 
rates 2006!). And apart from that it will be extremely difficult to retain goods listed in 
the GEL under AFTA/CEPT from massive tariff cuts. Sensitive industrial goods such as 
automobiles, motorcycles, chemical products, electric equipment, consumer electronics 
etc. are of particular interest to some prominent members of the WP (e.g. EU, Japan, 
Canada, Australia). Consequently, they will insist during the bilateral negotiations on 
                                                 
24 While such a “level playing field” (only modified to deal with proven externalities and other market 
imperfections) is an ultimate goal, the optimal transition towards this goal may well imply an only 
gradual phasing out of existing preferences and protectionist arrangements in order to facilitate 
adjustment and make it socially acceptable. For the sake of transparency the relevant conditions for 
such phasing out should be clearly specified and adhere to a binding timetable. The adjustment period 
granted should take into account the flexibility (and alternative employability) of factors of production 
currently committed in the sector. 
25 Whereas the simple average applied tariff rate is 16.24 percent, the average figure for all tariff lines 
subject to duty runs up to 24.1 percent (simple average for textiles and clothing 37.69 percent, fish and 
maritime products 28.67 percent, agricultural goods 28.73 percent). An import-weighted approach 
would reveal a much higher level of protection; however, detailed import statistics are not available.  
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substantially reduced tariffs to improve market access. Since tariff cuts under the BTA 
with the US are not that severe, the main challenge for Vietnamese manufacturers are 
the country’s obligations under AFTA/CEPT, where VN is actually practicing WTO. 
Past accessions have shown that applicants experience severe pressure to reduce 
average tariffs to about 20 percent for agricultural goods and to 10 percent (at most!) on 
manufactured products. Moreover, recent accessions have demonstrated that applicants 
must be prepared to participate in “zero-for-zero” initiatives, i.e. to eliminate tariffs on a 
broader range of products. 
Coherence of the tariff regime: Too many different tariff rates are applied for similar 
import products. Until the mid nineties 18 different categories of tires were subject to 
tariff rates between 5-50 percent. Although such incoherence of the tariff regime has 
been remedied for tires, other products still face considerable tariff dispersion. In order 
to protect local manufacturers electric motors (HS 850100) are taxed 30 percent (below 
750 W), 10 percent (0,75-37,5 kW), 5 percent (37,5-75 kW) and zero percent (above 75 
kW). The same appears to be true for paper26 or transmission shafts (HS 8483).27 Thus, 
accession negotiations would be facilitated if the dispersed tariff structure is flattened 
by applying uniform tariff rates within groups of similar (industrial) products.  
Improve tariff collection: In Vietnam - as in many developing countries - the taxation of 
cross-border transactions is an important source of government revenues. Since their 
significant fiscal role28 complicates rapid tariff cuts within the process of WTO 
accession, a tighter collection could provide some additional room for a reduction of 
nominal tariff rates without a corresponding loss of government revenues. However, 
complicated and not very consistent customs regulations, discretionary tariff exemptions, 
little motivation of customs officers to work because of their low salary (causing 
increased receptivity for bribes), insufficient or outdated IT infrastructure for effective 
                                                 
26 Composite paper for paperboard 3 percent, other paper 20 percent, writing paper 40 percent, copy 
paper 20 percent. 
27 For vehicles over 10 seats: 20 percent, for marine engines 10 percent, for all other engines 0 percent.  
28 According to budget data recently released by the Ministry of Finance, the taxation of imports 
contributes about 20-25 percent to government revenues (see 
http://www.mof.gov.vn/chingansach_e/dutoan.htm).   15 
clearance procedures29, lacking background and training in modern customs 
management, the lax inspection by higher authorities etc. are some prominent reasons for 
an overall meager performance30 of the customs administration. Simplifying the tariff 
regime and creating more favorable conditions for an effective taxation of cross-border 
transactions would have the added benefit of a more transparent enforcement of tariff 
regulations and may result in a higher overall tariff collection rate31  
Prepare for the elimination of (industrial) export subsidies: Although the Agreement on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) recognizes that “subsidies may play an 
important role in the economic development programs of developing country 
members”, none of the recent applicants was able to negotiate the flexible application of 
the SCM rules for d eveloping countries, which are laid down in Article 27 of the 
agreements special and differential treatment (S&D) provisions. For instance, low-
income countries with a per capita income of less than US$ 1000 (and which are 
mentioned in Annex VII to the Agreement) are totally exempted from the rule 
prohibiting export subsidies (Article 3).32 However, r ecently acceded low-income 
members (China, Moldova) committed that from the date of accession they “would not 
maintain any subsidies, i ncluding export subsidies, which met a definition of a 
prohibited subsidy within the meaning of Article 3 of the Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures, and would not introduce such prohibited subsidies from the 
day of accession.” Given their per capita income, which is substantially lower than US$ 
1000, these obligations are unusually severe. 
                                                 
29 However, an US project on the computerization of the customs administration, which has started in 
late 2000 is beginning to show some effect. 
30 According to Vietnam’ Memorandum of Foreign Trade Regime (See WTO: WT/ACC/VNM/2, page 
36) the average tariff collection rate was as low as 15 percent (1996) whereas the average tariff rate of 
major import items ran up to 33.5 percent at that time. In 2000 the simple average tariff rate was 23,96 
percent for all goods subject to import tariffs (see http://www.apec-
iap.org/document/VN_2001_IAP.htm) while the tariff revenue from these goods was only about 8.4 
percent of the import value (own calculations, based Ministry of Finance revenue data). 
31 Furthermore, reduced tariff rates would – ceteris paribus - help to reduce smuggling because of the 
reduced incentive to bypass the customs procedure. In particular those goods which are protected by 
high tariff barriers - such as (luxury) cars and cigarettes - are smuggled in large quantities. Although 
official figures are not available it is estimated that the total amount of smuggled goods runs up to US$ 
2 billion per annum (exceeding 12 percent of the total valued of imports). 
32 These countries will, however, be required to accept the obligation to prohibit export subsidies when 
their per capita income reach 1000 US$.  
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Since Vietnam still maintains some (export) subsidies that are not allowed under SCM 
Article 3  – (for instance the Export Reward Program, support for domestic or FIE 
enterprises which produce goods for export33) – it should be prepared to phase them out 
by the date of accession.  
Reconsider agricultural policy: Negotiations on agricultural issues will be extremely 
tough. Evaluating the Protocols of Accession of some recently joined member countries 
reveals that the demands Vietnam will (most likely) face will by far exceed the levels of 
commitments accepted by well-established WTO members. It can be expected that 
tariffs for agricultural products have to be bound at an average level of - at most – 20 
percent.34 However, in Vietnam the average i mport tariff rate for farm products is 
around 25 percent, with peak tariffs of 40-100 percent applied to fresh fruit, refined 
sugar, cereal products, wine, beer, tobacco products etc. Tariff rate quotas35 could be a 
solution to maintain some protection for domestic farmers, but negotiations will be 
harsh36 and members will request Vietnam to enter a commitment for administering 
TRQs in a simple, transparent, timely, predictable, uniform, non-discriminatory, and 
non-trade restrictive manner.37 Other contentious issues – e.g. still maintained non-tariff 
measures such as import prohibition (for tobacco products) and import licenses (refined 
                                                 
33 See document WT/ACC/VNM/13/Add.1 of January 2002 for details. 
34 The simple average tariffs for agricultural items (bound individually) are as follow: Ecuador 25.8 
percent, Bulgaria 34.9 percent, Kyrgyz Republic 11.7 percent, Latvia 33.6 percent, Estonia 17.7 
percent, Jordan 25 per cent, Georgia 12.1 percent, Croatia 10.4 percent, Albania 10.6 percent, Oman 
30.5 percent, Lithuania 15.6 percent, Moldova 12.4 percent; China 15 percent and Chinese Taipei 17.5 
percent. 
35 Tariff rate quotas apply a reduced rate for a specified quantity of imported goods. Imports above this 
specific quantity face a higher – often several hundred percent – tariff rate. Vietnam has not yet applied 
TQRs 
36 The agricultural part of the Goods Schedules contain TRQ’s as follow: Ecuador -17 commodities at 
the 6 and 8 digit level of the Harmonized System (HS); Mongolia - none; Bulgaria - 90 at HS 8 digit 
level; Panama - 57 at HS 8 digit level; Kyrgyz Republic - none; Latvia - 4 at HS 4, 6 and 8 digit level; 
Estonia – none; Jordan – none, Croatia 9 at HS 4, 6 and 8 digit level. Albania – none, Oman – none, 
Moldova – none, Lithuania – 4 at HS 4, 6 and 8 digit level; China – 46 at HS 8 digit level; Chinese 
Taipei 117 at HS 8 digit level. 
37 See conditions specified for China. Report of the Working Party (WT/ACC/CHN/49), p.21ff. The 
message here is that members will not allow that TRQs are exploited as formidable NTBs. According 
to WTO provisions seven principal methods of TRQ administration can be identified (e.g. 
licence on demand, first come first serve, historical, auction). Member nations must notify 
WTO about how they a dminister tariff quotas in their tariff schedules. See 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/tb1893/tb1893c.pdf or   17 
vegetable oil, raw and refined sugar) as well as minimum price r equirements 
(beverages) – further foreshadow difficult accession negotiations.38  
The stiffest opposition Vietnam will face is regarding domestic support and export 
subsidies for the agricultural sector. The Agreement of Agriculture (AoA) requires 
countries to accept commitments to reduce trade-distorting subsidies. For this purpose, 
the AoA divides subsidies into three categories: green, blue and amber subsidies.39 
Green and blue subsidies are permitted support measures to which reduction 
commitments do not apply. Amber (or yellow) subsidies that strongly impact upon trade 
have to be bound and reduced over time. Here, article 6.4 of the Agreement on 
Agriculture permits 10 percent “de minimis” domestic support for developing countries 
and 5 percent for developed countries (based on the calculation of the product specific 
value of agricultural production against a three-year reference period40). Recently 
joined members committed themselves to reduce the level of total domestic support 
(calculated as the Aggregate Measurement of Support, AMS) to de minimis level or 
below within a transition period of 4-7 years. Since most of them acceded as “developed 
country” the permissible ceiling rate for domestic support was only 5 percent.41 
Vietnam’s AMS has not exceeded 2 percent of the total agricultural production during 
1996-9842; i.e. is much below the critical level. There are, however, some indications 
that the government’s policy on domestic support has changed in the last three years, 
which might have some implications for the multilateral negotiation with WTO 
members on rules. Therefore, and as an orientation for the future, it should be 
considered to shift some domestic support measures from “amber” to “green” 
instruments.  
                                                                                                                                               
http://www.umanitoba.ca/afs/agric_economics/course/065.303/notes/Oct4.pdf for more details on TRQ 
administration. 
38 For more background see Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development: General report on analysis 
of Vietnam agricultural policy under the context of WTO, Hanoi 15 December 2001, downloadable 
under http://www.isgmard.org.vn/Information%20Service/Report/Report.asp. 
39 "Blue" subsidies are direct payments under production limitation programs (narcotics) or preferential 
credit programs. "Green" subsidies are, for example, government expenditure on agricultural research, 
pest control, marketing and promotion services, financial participation by governments in income 
insurance and income safety-net programs, payments for natural disaster, environmental or regional 
assistance programs.  
40 The most recent period for which data were available was used in all cases, except Bulgaria.  
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More critical for Vietnam are export subsidies, which are considered the most trade 
distorting of subsidies granted by governments. Applicants have experienced severe 
pressure (in particular by the so-called Cairns Group of agricultural exporters) to 
commit themselves to eliminate export subsidies (a commitment that goes much further 
than what was agreed during the Uruguay round). Ecuador, Mongolia, Kyrgyz 
Republic, Latvia, Jordan, Taiwan, Lithuania, Moldova and China, for instance, 
confirmed that, by the date of accession, they would not maintain or introduce any (!) 
export subsidies on agricultural products. Vietnam, in contrast, has awarded direct 
subsidies for exports of agricultural goods since 1998. Export subsidies, although very 
limited in total amount, first were given for pineapples plus preferential loans for 
vegetable, fruit and pork meat exporting enterprises. In 1998 an Export Reward Fund 
(ERF) was established, which has compensated, for instance, emerging losses from rice 
and coffee exports and provided direct support for the export of c anned cucumber, 
pineapples, plums and pork meat. Meanwhile the ERF is transformed into an “Export 
Support Fund”, ESF, which is  - according to official sources  - fully consistent with 
WTO provisions. Communication with the WTO (WT/ACC/VNM/13/Add.1) reveals, 
however, that recipients are mainly enterprises that trade in agricultural products. 
Assistance is provided by preferential i nterest rates, direct financial support, export 
rewards and “other forms of support” under a Prime Minister’s decision (for which data 
is not available). The total amount of subsidies43 provided by this fund was US$ 9.2 
million in 2000.  
Non-tariff Barriers (NTB). The last issue to be discussed under the Goods section are 
government measures other than tariffs that restrict trade flows and thus contravene 
WTO provisions. Examples include quantitative restrictions, import licensing, customs 
valuation procedures, rules of origins, trade-related investment measures, standards (i.e. 
technical barriers to trade), sanitary and phytosanitary regulations that aim at ensuring 
food security, preventing animal- or plant-borne diseases from entering a country as 
well as other issues which are covered by corresponding WTO agreements. While some 
                                                                                                                                               
41 Only China was able to negotiate an in-between domestic support rate of 8.5 percent. 
42 Based on the calculation for the reference period 1996-1998, see in WT/ACC/VNM/4. 
43 Including those for industrial products.   19 
of those agreements are relatively straight forward, leaving not much room for 
interpretation, the implementation of others could be exploited for r estricting trade 
flows.44  
For practical reasons only two NTBs will be discussed in detail here: Quantitative 
Restrictions (QRs) and Import Licensing. Chapter 6 will deal with some other NTBs.  
Quantitative Restrictions: The WTO Agreement on Trade in Goods recognizes that 
countries may wish to protect their industries from foreign competition, but urges them 
to provide protection only through (reasonable) tariffs. Article 11 of GATT’47, which 
prohibits member countries to use QRs on imports, reinforces this principle.45 All past 
accessions under WTO provisions have demonstrated that applicants must confirm their 
commitment to eliminate upon accession all quantitative restrictions on imports46 that 
cannot be justified under the provisions of WTO Agreements. 
Although Vietnam has continued to phase out existing QRs some years ahead of agreed 
schedules47 it still imposes quantitative import restrictions on some products.48 
Moreover, it remains questionable whether tenable reasons for all goods that are banned 
from importation can be provided. It is not clear, for instance, if import restrictions for 
“toxic chemicals”, “debauched and reactionary cultural products, children’s toys badly 
affecting the personality education, social order” or for “cigarettes, cigars, and other 
forms of finished cigarettes”49 are based on internationally accepted standards and 
applied in an uniform, not discriminatory manner.  
                                                 
44 But they necessitate extensive background knowledge of the corresponding WTO agreements, and – at 
least partially  - considerable institutional/research capacities to construct arguments for their 
application against other WTO members (e.g. SPS & TBT agreements). 
45 The rule, however, is subject to specified exceptions (e.g. when countries are in balance-of-payments 
difficulties). 
46 As well as other non-tariff measures such as licensing, quotas, bans, permits, prior authorization 
requirements, licensing requirements etc. 
47 In some agreements with the IMF, Japan and the US Vietnam had agreed to lift QRs on the import of 
paper, clinker and ceramic tiles in early 2003 and on wine and beverages in 2005. Actually, those 
quantitative restrictions were eliminated by 1 May 2001. 
48 For more details see Annex I to WT/ACC/VNM/9.  
49 See Decision No. 45/2001/QD-TTg of 3 April 2001.  
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In any case, QRs as well  as import bans must be administered in a transparent and 
incontestable way.50 Otherwise Vietnam must be prepared to eliminate them prior to 
accession.  
Import Licensing: Import licensing procedures can adversely affect the flow of imports, 
particularly if these procedures are not transparent or if they unnecessarily delay the 
issue of licenses. Licensing requirements are adopted for administering quantitative 
restrictions under, e.g., Balance of Payments provisions or Safeguard action51 or for 
purposes of maintaining trade statistics. The Agreement on Import Licensing 
Procedures lays down clear rules and principles for the issuing of national import 
licenses and distinguish between automatic and non-automatic licenses.52  
Vietnam has gradually liberalized her import-export licensing requirements. Today, all 
domestic enterprises irrespective whether they are manufacturing or trading 
enterprises53 are allowed to export and import goods54 Restrictions for foreign invested 
enterprises that are only engaged in trading were, for the first time, eased by September 
2000. Limitations for the importation of Portland cement (black and white), motorcycles 
and passenger cars with nine seats or less will be phased out by 1 January 2003. Some 
sensitive items, however, will remain under import license requirements, such as sugar 
(refined or crude), petroleum products, animal feeds, veterinary or plant protection 
drugs, radio transmitters/receivers, printing machines, medicines for human use, etc. 
Since not all import permits are administered in a non-transparent way, thus attracting 
                                                 
50 That is to say, they are imposed for reasons of national security, public health, environment etc. 
Recent accessions have shown that import bans that cannot be justified under the provisions of the WTO 
agreement have to be abolished (Ecuador eliminated by 1 July 1996 its import bans on used articles, e.g., 
bans on used clothing, automobiles and tires, Lithuania abolished the import ban on sugar products and 
Chinese Taipei eliminated the import ban on motorcycles over 150cc six months and on passenger cars 
equipped with diesel engines two years after accession to the WTO.)  
51 See Understanding on Balance-of-Payment Provision of GATT ´94 as well as Agreement on 
Safeguards.  
52 Automatic licenses are granted „in all cases … within a maximum period of 10 working days”. 
Provisions for non-automatic licenses are somewhat more complex but the procedure of granting 
import licenses must be handled in a transparent, objective and as simple as possible way. Moreover, 
when QRs are administered by national authorities they must take into account the purpose for which 
licenses are adopted. 
53 The only prerequisite is that they are fully Vietnamese owned.  
54 The importation of some goods is, however, prohibited for safety, health or environmental reasons (see 
above).   21 
attention from WTO members, it is recommended to formulate an Action Plan on the 
implementation of the WTO Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures and to submit 
it to the Working Party as soon as possible. 
 
 
4  Trade in Services 
Services are an important part of international trade. Many service sectors provide 
inputs to other industries and have supporting roles in the production of goods. The 
timely, accurate and sufficient supply of services55 reduces transaction costs for ex-
porting manufacturing enterprises and thus co-determines the competitiveness of their 
internationally traded goods.  Since growth in the manufacturing sector must be 
accompanied by growth in service industries as well, bottlenecks in the latter certainly 
impact upon macroeconomic performance and development.  56 If domestic providers 
are unable to meet the demands of exporting enterprises for high-quality services, it 
should be considered to permit foreign sources of supply.  
The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) has brought, for the first time, 
service transactions under an international regime. The agreement requires countries not 
to discriminate between service providers and products of different countries (MFN-
principle)57 and to establish enquiry points, from which (foreign) service suppliers can 
obtain information on laws and regulations affecting service transactions. Furthermore, 
members are obliged to mutually recognize qualifications which they demand for the  
                                                 
55 Services which are of particular importance to exporting enterprises are communication services (in 
particular basic and value-added telecommunication services), business services (legal and 
accountancy services, management consulting, market research), financial services (insurance / 
banking), as well as transport services (maritime or air transport services, cargo-handling, storage and 
warehouse services). 
56 For example, a country that exports agricultural products may benefit from the liberalisation of the 
transport sector, enabling freight costs to be reduced and improving the position of its products on 
international markets. 
57 However, in order to maintain preferential treatment under regional or bilateral cooperation 
agreements, exceptions to the MFN rule are permitted. These exemptions, which are listed in the 
country’s Schedule of Concessions, are temporary and under review every five years.  
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supply of services. Liberalization obligations, which are laid down in so-called 
Schedules of Concessions58 comprise two types of commitments: a) horizontal, which 
apply for all sectors and b) the more focused sectoral commitments. 
For many years Vietnam has taken a rather restrictive approach to market opening in 
services59 since this part of the Vietnamese economy is commonly perceived as not 
very competitive compared with internationally experienced suppliers.60 Consequently, 
the Vietnamese government has offered only very conditional investment opportunities 
to foreign providers. Market access limitations are imposed by, for instance, permitting 
only Business Cooperation Contracts (for postal, express delivery and 
telecommunication services), restricting the number of branch offices (legal services) or 
licensees (insurance). Other measures include the limitation of the scope of business 
activities (tourism, banking, construction) or the granting of licenses on a case-by-case 
basis, “depending on the particular domestic demand” (distribution).61  
In order to advance membership preparations Vietnam is expected to be much more 
generous in its market access commitments than developing countries have been during 
the Uruguay Round. Past accessions have shown that new members took on obligations 
that go beyond those initially negotiated under GATS. Horizontal as well as specific 
commitments of all recently acceded transition economies are comprehensive and 
ambitious. Limitations on market access are fewer than in many developing countries 
with high per capita income and, as a whole, more comparable to the commitments of 
developed countries.  
                                                 
58 The General Agreement on Trade in Services distinguishes between four Modes of Supply under 
which services can be provided:: (1) cross-border supply, i.e. telecommunication- or internet-based 
services (2) consumption abroad, (3) commercial presence, and (4) presence of natural persons.  
59 By, for instance, so-called “business cooperation contracts” (BCC), where foreign and domestic 
partner(s) share profits and losses without creating a unified legal entity; an approach that was pretty 
popular for telecom services. There is, however, one central problem with BCCs: irrespective of their 
paid-up capital (!) disputants are exhorted to settle their differences through negotiation and 
conciliation.  
60 Restrictions are also imposed in order to protect public moral or essential security interests. 
61 Current licensing and qualification requirements can be found in Vietnam’s Individual Action Plan 
(IAP) under APEC (see http://www.apec-iap.org/document/VN_2002_IAP.htm). Somewhat outdated 
information on the regime in services in 1998 is provided by accession document WT/ACC/VNM/5.   23 
Vietnam’s WTO accession preparations must find a deliberate balance between the 
requirements of modernizing service industries so that they can play a supportive role 
for economic growth, and the legitimate - but difficult to defend - interest not to expose 
all service sectors with some development potential to unbridled foreign competition. 
Service sectors where Vietnam is perceived to possess a comparative advantage are 
tourism, computer and related services, construction, health-related services62 and some 
maritime transport services. Conversely, among sectors where liberalisation will 
strengthen commercial infrastructure are distribution, transport, and some highly 
complex, specialized services that demand know-how-intensive inputs such as 
telecommunications or financial services.63  
Since trade officials in transition economies are usually somewhat unaware of the 
importance of the service sector for maintaining the country’s economic growth it is 
also advisable for Vietnam to implement the following measures for further 
streamlining accession negotiations:  
•  Examine critical inter-sectoral linkages, i.e. other (service) sectors where 
providers depend on other service inputs to be competitive (tourism, for 
instance, depends on architectural and construction services (design of hotels), 
local transportation (excursions), education and training (hotel staff), 
telecommunication and management services, banking64 etc.). 
•  Remove all unfair barriers (administrative and regulatory, establishing a “level 
playing filed”) to the development of a broadly based domestic service sector; 
see below. 
                                                 
62 Cuba, for instance, has developed a strategy for attracting tourists for vacation plus low-cost medical 
treatment. Since health-care professionals can provide quality service at very reasonable rates this 
model has turned out to be a major success-story. (See http://www.cubatravelusa.com/Health-
Care%20Tourism.htm). Vietnam, with its very comparable conditions, could apply a similar approach.  
63 However, concerning the key role played by financial services in the domestic economy great 
prudence has to be exercised when considering their liberalisation. 




•  Assess the competitiveness of domestic service suppliers and identify existing 
market entry barriers to trade in services by conducting in-depth studies in some 
prominent service sectors. 
•  Identify export opportunities for internationally competitive services. Formulate 
and/or review concrete action plans to support the sector’s growth and 
development.65 Consider also the potential of small and medium sized 
enterprises to tap foreign service markets.66  
•  Reconsider objectives for domestic regulation of services (attain social goals 
(pricing i ssues of services e.g. for “natural” monopolies), ensuring quality or 
certain standards, ideological or public moral-related reservations, national 
security concerns, maintaining rents for some privileged groups, fiscal or 
budgetary reasons etc.). 
•  Clarify policy objectives for promoting further economic growth (“What is 
intended to be achieved in 10 years time?”). Decide on restrictions on (foreign) 
market entry, business license requirements, deviations from the national 
treatment principle etc. but consider also appropriate policies and incentives for 
business development. 
•  Implement focused and firmly the policy program for those service industries 
and keep in mind that the complementary development of service industries is of 
vital importance for sound macroeconomic performance.  
The initial offer which was provided for the 5
th Working Party Meeting in April 2002 
seems to reflect a (cautiously) liberal approach to services and is thus a good starting 
point for bilateral negotiations. Horizontal restrictions are moderate and MFN 
exceptions are few, but the sectoral part of the schedule contains several transition 
                                                 
65 Including the necessary degree of foreign competition on the domestic market for spurring local 
providers’ performance.  
66 Service exports can (partly) absorb abundant, less qualified labor and create job opportunities for 
skilled university graduates who often find it difficult to obtain work.   25 
periods and other r estrictions67 that may be strongly challenged in bilateral 
negotiations.  
However, of some more immediate relevance is the overall regulatory framework for 
those service sectors which are designated to experience more foreign competition. 
Some urgent issues to be addressed are: 
•  Ease / fade out restrictions on national treatment for foreign service suppliers 
(qualification requirements, taking of mortgages etc.), limitations on the number 
of suppliers (e.g. exclusive service suppliers, economic needs test, numerical 
quotas), the number of natural persons employed, measures requiring specific 
types of legal entities (BCC) and limitations on the share of foreign capital. 
•  The reasonable and objective administration of all domestic regulations affecting 
trade in services by central authorities in Hanoi (including auxiliary licenses and 
authorizations which have to be granted within a reasonable time). Here, clear 
procedures are to be maintained and instituted (!) to review contentious 
administrative decisions. 
•  Central authorities seem to have not always full control of the policies and 
licensing regulations of provincial entities. This creates uncertainty and 
competitive disparities among foreign service providers and demands, moreover, 
for appropriate measures to assure the consistent interpretation and 
administration of relevant laws and provisions throughout the country. 
•  Providing gradually better access for foreign services providers – e.g. under the 
BTA - increases competition on the domestic market. Former monopolies and 
exclusive service suppliers will come under pressure and may tend to abuse their 
dominant position for adopting unfair and competition-distorting practices. 
Therefore it should be considered to revise the broader policy package that 
addresses regulatory reform and competition policy. To be more precise, 
Vietnam can expect, for instance, that WTO commitments in 
telecommunications will include the Reference Paper on Regulatory Principles. 
                                                 
67 E.g. five year transition periods for distribution, telecommunication and banking services; unbound 
market access limitations for insurance (Mode 1, 2 and 4).  
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This paper calls - among other issues - for the establishment of an independent 
regulatory body in order to safeguard domestic competition (Article 5). Since 
Vietnam is in the process of drafting the Law on Competition Policy it should be 
considered to establish an independent supervisory authority to regulate - in the 
public interest - telecom services (a recommendation which is also of practical 
relevance for implementing obligation under the US BTA!68) 
 
 
5  Trade-related Intellectual Property Rights – TRIPs 
The process of globalization reveals that the competitiveness of economies is less 
determined by traditional factors of production such as land, natural resources or 
capital. Today, technology as well as sufficiently qualified manpower are more 
prominent inputs that affect the ability of a country to maintain high economic growth 
rates than some decades ago. Hence, a “knowledge-based economy" is built on the 
stimulation, expansion and application of knowledge and information. Success and 
sound macroeconomic performance lies in innovation, entrepreneurial spirit and ability 
of those economies to turn knowledge into profit. Countries that are not able to protect 
innovations and other creations of the human mind are imposing high transaction costs 
on commercial activities, thus restricting national competitiveness and running at risk of 
falling behind.  
The WTO Agreement on Trade-related Aspects on Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 
establishes minimum standards of protection for a wide range of intellectual property 
rights69 (IPRs) and lays down procedures and remedies for their enforcement. It builds 
                                                 
68 In Annex F of the US BTA reference is made not only to the Annex on Telecommunication of GATS 
but also on the far more comprehensive Reference Paper on Telecoms, that demands the establishment 
of a regulatory body which “is separate from, and not accountable to, any supplier of basic 
telecommunications services.” 
69 Such as patents, copyright and related rights, trademarks, industrial designs, layout of integrated 
circuits, undisclosed information (including trade secrets), geographical indications (incl. appellation 
of origin)   27 
on and extends the existing international conventions on IPRs70 and codifies the private 
character of IPRs.71 The Agreement provides a transition period of five years for 
developing countries (i.e. up to 1. January 2000) and of 11 years (up to January 2006) 
for least developing countries.  
Recent accession agreements have shown, however, that almost all new members have 
entered the binding obligation “to fully apply the provisions of the Agreement on TRIPS 
by the date of accession, without recourse to any transitional period” [accentuation by 
the author]. Only the very first new member of WTO, Ecuador, was granted a transition 
period of six months (until 1 July 1996). Other entries were not able to negotiate for the 
transition period provided by the TRIPS agreement. Thus it is obvious, that the effective 
implementation of TRIPs-conform legislation  prior to accession is of utmost 
importance (and practically non-negotiable!) for any applicant.  
In the past few years, Vietnam has made considerable efforts to improve its legal 
framework on intellectual property. However, since enforcement institutions are weak 
and the strict enforcement of IPRs is often perceived as counterproductive for 
Vietnam’s development72 efforts to prepare the strict TRIPs obligations have so far 
been rather halfhearted.  
A more reasonable approach to this important issue is developing in the context of the 
negotiations of the IPR commitments under the US BTA73 (which requires Vietnam to 
implement IPR obligations – comparable to those under TRIPS - within a timeframe of 
                                                 
70 E.g. Berne Convention on copyright (1971 revision), Paris Convention on industrial property (1967 
revision), the Rome Convention (broadcasting, producers of phonograms), Treaty on Intellectual 
Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits etc. 
71 Developing countries, however, perceive know - how protected under IPRs, at least partially, as public 
goods and have argued, for instance, that urgent needs to prevent the spreading of human diseases 
(HIV) may call  for a termination of protection rights. (Meanwhile, a decision by the WTO council 
responsible for intellectual property has been approved on 27 June 2002, to extend until 2016 the 
transition period during which least-developed countries do not have to provide patent protection for 
pharmaceuticals.) 
72 Because TRIPS prohibits reverse engineering, ensures monopoly rents for – foreign – patent holders, 
protects computer software etc. 
73 The BTA, however, goes beyond the TRIPs Agreement. Article 5 of Chapter II o n Intellectual 
Property Rights protects encrypted program-carrying satellite signals. An issue which is not mentioned 
under the TRIPs agreement.  
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12 to 30 months after ratification74). The enforcement, however, remains difficult since 
corresponding institutions seem not well prepared or detailed implementation provisions 
7 are still not available. Therefore it is highly recommended to: 
•  Issue legal documents on specific IPR issues (e.g. reversal of the burden of 
proof75, IPR registrations, protection of layout designs of integrated circuits / of 
computer programs and compilations of data, prevent the release of infringed 
goods by customs authorities etc.). Ensure that adequate and effective civil and 
administrative procedures and remedies are available to obtain redress against 
infringements of IPRs. 
•  Simplify administrative procedures for ensuring the expeditious granting of 
intellectual property rights. 
•  Upgrade IPR enforcement infrastructure (computerization, electronic filing 
system / IPR network). 
•  Further strengthen the capacity of IPR agencies to restrain IPR infringements by 
increasing enforcement institution’s responsibilities or by establishing new IPR 
authorities (consider also the streamlining of the IPR regime’s institutional 
landscape). 
•  Conduct regular and extensive training programs for IP officials, e.g. on patent 
search and examination. 
•  Intensify international networking (exchange of information, cooperation in 
international fora & authorities, e.g. Berne Convention, International Union for 
the Protection of New Varieties of Plants). 
•  Raising public awareness for the importance of IPRs by mass media, seminars, 
taking up the protection of intellectual property in curricula.  
                                                 
74 The agreed transition periods are: for trademarks and patents 12 months, for copyrights and trade 
secrets 18 months, and for the protection of phonograms (Geneva Convention) 30 months. 
75 Article 34.1 of the TRIPS Agreement stipulates that the burden of proof in process patent infringement 
actions is shifted to the defendant. In Vietnam, however, the burden of proof is imposed upon the 
plaintiff (according to prevailing laws and regulations).   29 
Much support on IPR issues is provided by the Swiss project on enforcement of IPRs, 
Japan’s support to the National Office of Industrial Property (NOIP) as well as by the 
USAID STAR project, which focuses – among other issues – on intellectual property 
rights under the US BTA.76 
 
 
6  Other WTO provisions & agreements 
Full WTO memberships will require Vietnam to adopt many technical rules and 
provisions that are obligatory and non-negotiable. Thus, domestic legislation (some of 
which may even have still to be drafted) must observe corresponding WTO provisions 
and agreements. Past accessions have clearly demonstrated that: 
•  Customs valuation must be based on the transaction value of traded goods upon 
accession. Minimum price lists/conditions have to be abolished. Additional fees 
imposed by local/provincial authorities which do not comply with the national 
treatment principle, i.e. discrimination between imports of local and of foreign 
enterprises, are prohibited. Moreover, some countries committed to observe the 
Decision of the Committee on Customs Valuation of 13 October 1995 on the 
Valuation of Carrier Media Bearing Software for Data Processing Equipment77 
and the Treatment of Interest Charges in the Customs Value of Imported Goods 
(see WTO Document G/VAL/5). Both provisions impact upon custom revenues. 
•  National anti-dumping, countervailing and safeguards legislation must fully 
comply with corresponding WTO agreements.78 Where legislation was not in 
place at the time of accession79 the applicants committed full conformity of pro 
                                                 
76 Hank Baker, STAR’s resident trade lawyer, is an expert in TRIPs issues. 
77 The decision decrees “in determining the customs value of imported carrier media data or instructions, 
only the cost or value of the carrier medium itself shall be taken into account.”  
78 China committed to revise its current regulations and procedures prior to accession.  
79 Latvia, Estonia, Georgia, Albania, Oman, Croatia, Lithuania, Moldova.  
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visions to be d eveloped and, at least most of them, not to  apply any anti-
dumping, countervailing or safeguard measure to imports from WTO Members 
until it had notified and implemented appropriate laws in conformity with the 
WTO provisions. 
•  All measures inconsistent with the Agreement on Trade-related Investment 
Measures (TRIMs) such as requirements on local content, forex surrender and/or 
balancing, export performance etc. have to be abolished prior to accession.80 
•  Technical standards as well as sanitary and phytosanitary provisions, as 
maintained by Agreements on SPS and TBT Agreements, have to be applied in a 
non-arbitrary manner from the date of accession without recourse to any 
transition periods.81 
•  Domestic provisions on Rules of Origin (RoO) for trade under MFN as well as 
under preferential agreements must be in conformity with the WTO agreement 
on Rules of Origin prior to accession. Since work on the harmonization of the 
different concepts for determining the origin of goods is still in progress some 
members (Kyrgyz & China) committed in advance to adopt harmonized RoO 
(for imports under non-preferential regimes) once they will be finalized by the 
joint WTO / WCO82 working group.  
•  State trading enterprises have to fully conduct their business under commercial 
terms, i.e. they must have full management autonomy and responsibility to their 
own profits and losses.83 Activities of such enterprises have to be notified to the 
WTO Secretariat.84  
Thus, Vietnam is advised to formulate action plans and to designate sufficient 
institutional capacity to implement those agreements in a timely and efficient manner 
                                                 
80 Only Ecuador managed to negotiate a transition period of up to 1.1.2000 to phase out non-
conformities, (but committed a stand still clause, i.e. not to introduce any new measures which increase 
the degree of non-conformity).  
81 Only China was able to negotiate some exemptions to the TBT Agreement (see paragraph 197 of the 
Report of the Working Party).  
82 World Customs Organization. 
83 That is to say they have to observe Article XVII of GATT and Article VII of GATS. 
84 Moreover, Estonia and Oman committed “to eventually eliminate their state trading role”.   31 
(again, prior to accession!).85 In particular provisions on anti-dumping and safeguards 
are important instruments to address unfair trade practices of foreign suppliers and can 
help to cope with a surge of imports causing serious injury to domestic industry. Their 
application, however, requires detailed knowledge of relevant WTO provisions, 
sufficient and well-managed analytical capacity, and a domestic industry sector familiar 
with the rules relevant in this area.86 Moreover, it is highly recommended to program 
corresponding legislative action in a way that there is enough time for getting a sound 
experience with the administration of those fairly complex instruments, i.e. before full 
membership is achieved.87  
Additional issues of particular concern are obligations to be expected beyond present 
WTO requirements. Plurilateral Agreements under WTO are arrangements that are not a 
precondition for WTO membership in principle. At present plurilateral agreements are 
administered for trade in civil aircraft and for the procurement of products and services 
by governments. Whereas membership in the first named agreement became an 
obligation for more than half of recently acceded member countries88, negotiating the 
conditions of entry to the Agreement on Government Procurement seems to be 
inevitable, a ccording to past accession experiences.89 Since Vietnam has gained a 
doubtful reputation for its opaque tender procedures it will experience much pressure 
from current WTO members to implement the provision of this agreement and to 
                                                 
85 Plans and schedules have been designed by MoT’s Multilateral Trade Policy Department for the 
implementation of Article VII of GATT or Customs Valuation (WT/ACC/VNM/20), for the 
Implementation of the TRIMs Agreement (WT/ACC/VNM/18), and for the implementation of the SPS 
Agreement (May 2000). They provide a sound basis for action to be taken. 
86 There has been a steady increase in the number of anti-dumping and countervailing actions among 
WTO members, confirming that those rules can be (mis) appropriated for protectionist purposes (e.g. 
US - EU steel dispute)  
87 Document WT/ACC/VNM/15/Add.1 (Legislation Program up to 2003) provides a useful perspective.  
88 Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Estonia, Georgia, Albania, Croatia, L ithuania, Moldova, and Oman. Some 
however, were able to negotiate some delay before they become signatory to this agreement (Kyrgyz 
Republic, Oman and Moldova).  
89 Of all accessions to the WTO only Ecuador – the first new member of the global trade body after its 
establishment in 1995 – did not become signatory to that plurilateral agreement.  
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specify the products and services to be covered within a very short time frame after 
accession (max. one year).90 
7  Action to be taken in reform Areas not directly related To trade 
WTO accession addresses a wide range of reform areas that are  – for not always 
obvious reasons – linked to trade and integration issues91: 
•  An appropriate macroeconomic framework92 is as important as viable and stable 
structures of legal, regulatory and financial institutions.  
•  Foreseeable tariff reductions may require to rethink fiscal and budgetary policy 
(broadening the base for all taxes, i.e. reducing tax privileges as well as budget 
consolidation by drying out “undue” subsidization of SOEs).  
•  Shaping the legal system requires skill and decisiveness, since reforms require 
improving the independent status of courts and judges as well as the systematic 
public release of all legal documents and court decisions. 
•  Obligations on privatization have become compulsory for new (transition) 
members, thus demanding binding commitments to transfer public ownership 
rights to private hands and to establish a level playing field for the nascent 
private sector.93  
•  Institutional arrangements and property rights should be well defined, thus 
requiring accelerated as well as comprehensive administrative reforms. 
•  Allow sufficient flexibility in exchange rate management.94  
                                                 
90 Regarding goods it has become common practice that the agreement applies to all purchases of listed 
procurement entities. The purchase of services is much less covered, but has predominantly included 
construction services.  
91 Other issues such as intellectual property, standardization, and the protection of human, animal and 
plant life have been addressed already in previous chapters. 
92 E.g. low level of inflation, stable financial markets, sound fiscal policies, reasonably faded-out capital 
controls, an environment promoting exports. 
93 Pls. refer to chapter 7.2 for more details. 
94 Since imports surge (the trade deficit this year may exceed 2 billion US$) the exchange rate against the 
US Dollar is increasingly coming under pressure. Although the deficit has been offset by other external 
revenue sources through rising disbursement of ODA funds and increased overseas remittances by Viet 
Khieu, it remains unclear whether those inflows remain high and stable enough to cover a potentially   33 
                                                                                                                                               
widening trade deficit caused by AFTA/CEPT implementation. Thus, the exchange rate should be 
allowed to play an increasing role in the external adjustment process.   
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•  The National Treatment Principle of WTO should be anchored in domestic 
competition policy by setting up anti-trust regulations and authorities. 95 
•  The business community - (private) enterprises & business associations - must 
be prepared (and permitted!) to take over their essential role in co-determining 
national trade policy by articulating needs and concerns.  
•  Human resource capacity building has to be addressed for reducing deficiencies 
in trade-related expertise and/or negotiation skills (e.g. by systematically 
overhauling and updating curricula at university & commercial colleges).  
•  Standardization and inspection capacities (as required by TBT, SPS and TRIPs 
agreement) have to be brought to a level corresponding to international 
standards.  
•  Special social safety net arrangements may be required for softening undue 
hardship for redundant labor at the initial phase of WTO-membership (frictional 
unemployment).  
Among those pressing reform issues, three topics of particular importance will be 
discussed here more in detail. 
7.1  Tax reform 
Like other transition economies Vietnam had a somewhat arbitrary and narrowly based 
tax structure when fiscal reforms gained ground in the early 1990s. Now, the country 
has a tax system, that is imperfect, but, at least, it functions and raises revenues from 
various kinds of consumption, income, and trade.96 Among all taxes, levies imposed on 
cross-border transaction contribute significantly (around 20 percent) to current budget 
revenues.97 Therefore, tariff cuts - as to be implemented under AFTA/CEPT and US 
                                                 
95 It should be considered to draft and apply only one unified business law for both, SOEs as well as 
private enterprises! 
96 However, the present tax system, with all its exemptions and deductions, conflicts with the principles 
of transparency, practicability, and continuity in tax ation and thus distorts and complicates economic 
activities unnecessarily through high transaction costs. 
97 See budgetary data provided by Ministry of Finance at http://www.mof.gov.vn/index_e.html.   35 
BTA schedules - create opposition not only because of their implications for domestic 
industry protection. They are (at least!) of similar importance because of their strong 
impact upon government revenues.  
For securing sustainability of the national fiscal position, and in order to provide 
additional leeway for tariff reduction negotiations conducted with current WTO 
members, the government should consider the following measures: 
•  Make taxation more transparent and predictable. 
•  Broaden the tax base (i.e. unify VAT rates98 and narrow disparities in corporate 
income tax rates).  
•  Revise the individual income tax system so that it conforms to international 
norms.99  
•  Remove discretionary tax breaks, abolish tax discrimination between local and 
foreign enterprises and employees. 
•  Improve tax collection by modernizing tax administration and strengthening 
local revenue offices (training, infrastructure).  
•  Proceed firmly and in a non-discriminatory way against corruption and tax 
evasion. 
Without sustainable improvements at the revenue base, progressive trade liberalization 
will worsen the budget deficit and may threaten fiscal stability.  
                                                 
98 Although there is some evidence that the redistributive effects of indirect tax reforms tend to swamp 
the aggregated gains since they cause a sharp redistribution against lower income groups who spend a 
significant portion of their income on previously non-taxed products. See “Evaluating tax reform in 
Vietnam using general Equilibrium methods”, http://econpapers.hhs.se/paper/uwouwowop/9906.htm. 
99 Currently Individual Income Tax contributes less than 2 percent to total tax revenues, a percentage 
much lower than in most other countries. Different thresholds are applied for domestic and foreign 
employees; progressive taxation is eminent while no opportunities for deduction exist. However, at this 
stage of Vietnam's development, the revenue yield from the personal income tax is likely to be fairly 
low, but that yield should increase markedly if Vietnam's attempts at economic development are 
successful. The political obstacles to the design of a fair and progressive personal income tax are likely 
to be much less significant now, when the yield from the tax is low, than they will be in the future, 
when the yield will be high.  
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7.2  SOE reform 
Although WTO provisions do not contain a specific article about the ownership 
structure of enterprises, they implicitly assume that state enterprises must act in a 
manner consistent with the general principle of non-discriminatory treatment, i.e. they 
have to be run solely on a strictly commercial basis. Article XVII of GATT 94 obliges 
state enterprises100 to make purchases or sales solely in accordance with commercial 
considerations, including price, quality, availability and marketability, transportation 
and other conditions of purchase or sale” and that enterprises in other countries should 
be provided with adequate opportunity “to compete for participation in such purchases 
and sales.”101 Moreover, in order to ensure transparency of state enterprises, member 
countries are required to notify the WTO Secretariat on their activities.102 
Since the majority of state enterprises in transition economies are making losses, and 
because it is extremely difficult to demonstrate incontestably that state enterprises 
conduct their business operations solely on commercial considerations, many applicants 
have accepted demands of some prominent WTO members to implement 
comprehensive privatization programs103 and, moreover, to provide annual reports to 
WTO Members on developments in their programs of privatization.104 China was able 
to avoid  
                                                 
100 State enterprises – according to the definition provided by the Understanding on the Interpretation of 
Article XVII of GATT 94  – are “Governmental and non-governmental enterprises, including 
marketing boards, which have been granted exclusive or special rights or privileges, including 
statutory or constitutional powers, in the exercise of which they influence through their purchases or 
sales the level or direction of imports or exports” (see http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/08-
17_e.htm). 
101 The rationale behind this article is that state enterprises could undercut market access commitments if 
they do not obey the obligation to base operations purely on commercial considerations. 
102 Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XVII of GATT 94, Paragraph 1. 
103 Additional pressure has also been exercised in the past through privatization obligations under IMF 
Structural Adjustment Credits (SAC).  
104 Refer to Protocols of Accession of Mongolia, Bulgaria, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Estonia, Georgia, 
Albania, Croatia, Lithuania, Moldova and Taiwan.    37 
such a concession105 but confirmed that it would ensure that all state-owned and state-
invested enterprises obey the provisions under Article XVII of GATT ´94.106 
In Vietnam, it is obvious that strong reservations against accelerated privatization exist. 
The implementation of the multi-year SOE reform program – as agreed under SAC II – 
progresses at a very slow pace.107 However, poor management has left many SOEs 
with huge debts. Although well protected by extensive trade barriers, most of them are 
running at losses or are only marginally profitable. Non-performing loans, a 
consequence from their weak financial position, are increasingly endangering fiscal and 
(indirectly) monetary stability.  
However, although ideological reservations prevail on the Vietnamese side, and some 
empirical evidence exist that maladjusted privatization programs generate doubtful 
economic results108, there seems to be no other option than to persist with privatization. 
Otherwise, ineffective state supervision will continue to provide opportunities for rent 
seeking and thus create more burdens for the banking sector. In institutionally weak 
transition economies, like Vietnam, where the foundations of market economy are not 
well underpinned, privatization could be carried out less comprehensively and at a 
slower pace. But stakeholders should keep in mind that one advantage of the transfer of 
                                                 
105 However, the overall Chinese record of high and sustained growth, largely without comprehensive 
privatization of SOEs (at least so far) presents a sharp  contrast to generally poorer transition 
performance in other countries. Therefore, Joseph Stiglitz concluded that “China had shown that an 
economy might achieve more effective growth by focusing first on competition, leaving privatization 
until later” Stiglitz, Joseph: Knowledge for Development: Economic Science, Economic Policy and 
Economic Advice, address given at the 10
th Annual Bank Conference on Development Economics, 
World Bank 1998, http://www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/extme/js-abcde98/abcde98.pdf 
106 I n addition, the Government of China would not influence, directly or indirectly, commercial 
decisions on the part of state-owned or state-invested enterprises, including on the quantity, value or 
country of origin of any goods purchased or sold, except in a manner consistent with the WTO 
Agreement. 
107 The SOE reform measures under SAC II include removal of shareholding caps for SOE equitization; 
conducting diagnostic audits for the 50 largest SOEs; developing and implementing restructuring plans 
for three selected general corporations; enforcing bank credit ceilings on SOEs, especially 200 of the 
largest debtors, and monitoring quarterly bank credit and budget support for these firms; adopting and 
announcing a timetable and targets for equitization, divestiture, liquidation, and mergers over the next 
three years, announcing the sale of SOEs 30 days before receipt of bids; and establishing appropriate 
terms and conditions for a social safety net fund for SOE workers made redundant. For more 
information about the trade relevance of SAC II please refer to Riedel, James (1999): Structural 
Adjustment Credit II (PHRD Grant TF # 29443), Report to The Ministry of Trade, Government of the 
Socialist Republic of Vietnam, on Trade Policy Reform Issues in Vietnam.   
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property rights to private hands is that these firms would be confronted with a more 
effective constraint to make further claims on tight public resources or the preferential 
access to loans. 
In parallel with SOE reform, concrete measures to facilitate private sector development 
are of utmost importance. A v ibrant private sector would not only make the 
environment for SOEs more competitive, but also help absorb unemployment resulting 
from SOE reform.109 In any case, further action has to be taken to level the playing 
field between the state and the non-state sector, and to reduce market entry barriers 
beyond what has been achieved by the Enterprise Law.110 Eliminating disadvantages in 
the access to bank credit and commercial property by private entrepreneurs will create a 
more attractive climate for domestic private investment. Of similar importance are 
better (equal) access to government support programs, to infrastructure, training 
services/human resource development, to information on domestic and foreign markets, 
to technical consultancy, simplifications in the accounting and tax system and less 
administrative obstacles to the foundation of private sector business associations.111 
7.3  Legal reform 
International trade regimes, such as the WTO, relate in many ways to domestic laws and 
practices. In order to fulfil obligations under full WTO membership and for extending 
the rule of law, Vietnam will be required to design and implement a comprehensive 
legal reform and to coordinate donor support in this area. Among the many reforms 
Vietnam has to undertake for becoming a WTO member, legal reform is of crucial 
importance. Consulting China’s Protocol of Accession might help to elucidate what is 
                                                                                                                                               
108 Nellis, John: Time to Rethink Privatization in Transition Economies?, IFC Discussion Paper No. 38, 
Washington 1999 (http://www.ifc.org/economics/pubs/dp38/dp38.pdf). 
109 A complementary social safety net could help to mitigate the adverse social impact of intensified 
SOE reforms. 
110 Again, I strongly advocate the adoption of a unified business law (SOEs as well as private 
enterprises). 
111 For more information please refer to Vietnam’s Comprehensive Poverty Reduction and Growth 
Strategy (CPRGS), Hanoi May 2002, p. 50ff (http://poverty.worldbank.org/files/Vietnam_PRSP.pdf).   39 
ahead of Vietnam.  Under “Administration of the Trade Regime” (Article 2 of the 
Protocol of Accession),112 China agrees to:  
“apply and administer in a uniform, impartial and reasonable manner all its laws, 
regulations and other measures of the central government as well as local regulations, 
rules and other measures issued or applied at the sub-national level (collectively 
referred to as "laws, regulations and other measures") pertaining to or affecting trade 
in goods, services, trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights ("TRIPS") or 
the control of foreign exchange.” 
And, to  
“establish or designate, and maintain tribunals, contact points and procedures for the 
prompt review of all administrative actions relating to the implementation of laws, 
regulations, judicial decisions and administrative rulings of general application 
referred to in Article X:1 of the GATT 1994, Article VI of the GATS and the relevant 
provisions of the TRIPS Agreement. Such tribunals shall be impartial and independent 
of the agency entrusted with administrative enforcement and shall not have any 
substantial interest in the outcome of the matter.” 
Similar obligations can be expected for Vietnam. Currently, Vietnam’s legal system is 
still too intertwined with the country’s political bodies.113 Even after a decade of (often 
incremental and piecemeal) reforms the legal system remains largely underdeveloped 
and incapable to implement and enforce provisions of law. Causing great concerns is 
the - at present - very limited legal capacity to seek redress through any international 
dispute settlement mechanism (e.g. under WTO law!). The Cat Fish quarrel with the 
U.S. is a foretaste of trade-disputes which will occur more frequently when integration 
into the global economy progresses.  
Another issue of concern is that corruption and red-tapism  – indicating a lack of 
transparency as well as the insufficient rule of law - have a significant negative impact 
on foreign direct investment (and thus on economic growth). Since the legal system is 
                                                 
112 Refer to WT/ACC/CHN/49, p. 74 & 75. 
113 The basic problem is that there is no clear separation of powers and no distinct concept of 
independent judiciary.  
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still regarded as an instrument to maintain social discipline or to promote policy – rule 
by law, not rule of law – it is hoped WTO membership will accelerate the much-needed 
legal reform and help to bring uniformity and transparency that foreign investors have 
long sought and often not found. Clear and timely policy measures are needed for 
accelerating reform of the jurisdictional system. Action to be taken include upgrading 
legal professional education and training (in terms of quantity and quality), the 
systematic public release of legal documents and of court decisions, the improvement 
and streamlining of legal institutions and processes (e.g. independence of lawyers and 
courts, judicial reviews, right to comment before implementation) etc.114 Only by 
tackling those pivotal reform issues firmly will Vietnam regain ground as an attractive 
location for foreign investment.115 
 
 
8  Cross-references to AFTA, US BTA and APEC 
WTO accession and membership issues overlap to varying degrees with other 
integration projects; among which AFTA/CEPT, the US BTA and commitments under 
APEC are the most prominent ones.116 A particular feature of those obligations is that 
the coverage of the agreements tends to go well beyond conventional goods-related 
market a ccess concessions. However, although commitments considerably overlap 
across agreements117 implementation has been conducted, so far, in an irregular and not 
very well  
                                                 
114 The Legal System Development Needs Assessment (LNA), a study in which key Vietnamese state 
legal agencies have collaborated closely with international legal experts, provides concrete steps for 
improvements. Under http://www.vnforum.org/docs/gov/law/en/Exsum_5_8_English.doc an executive 
summary is available. 
115 However, even if there is enough political will at the central level, Vietnam will have a difficult time 
ensuring compliance at the subnational (i.e. provincial, district and municipal) levels and upgrading the 
judicial system for efficiently managing and reviewing trade and investment disputes!  
116 Others projects with integration-relevant provisions are the IMF’s PRGF, the World Bank’s PRSC, 
the Miyazawa Plan, and the recently agreed creation of a China-ASEAN Free Trade Area. 
117 For example obligations under US BTA anticipate concessions required from Vietnam before joining 
the WTO, and AFTA/CEPT requires certain customs reforms that will be compatible with standards of 
the global trade authority as well.   41 
coordinated manner, reflecting both the lack of a coherent integration strategy as well as 
insufficient coordination capacity.  
Since obligations accepted by Vietnam cannot be discussed here in detail for reasons of 
space and complexity, only the main features of bilateral or regional trade agreements 
are to be highlighted.118  
8.1  AFTA/CEPT  
Most of the changes induced by AFTA require the removal of trade restrictions and the 
easing of market access among members. Under the Common Effective Preferential 
Tariff (CEPT) Agreement ASEAN members are requested to reduce tariffs to 0 -5 
percent for a wide range of products traded within the region.119 For the initial six 
signatories the ending year of tariff reduction schedules was moved up to 2002; for the 
new members of ASEAN it depends on the date when i mplementation of CEPT 
obligations were started, i.e. in the case of Vietnam commitments have to be 
implemented by 2006.120 The CEPT reduction schedule affects four categories of 
products/items summarized in (1) the Inclusion List, IL, (2) the Temporary Exclusion 
List, TEL, (3) the Sensitive List, SL, and (4) the General Exception List, GE. 121 
                                                 
118 Currently UNDP Hanoi together with the NCIEC conducts a so-called “Integration Study”, which 
aims at helping the government of Vietnam “to undertake an initial baseline study for preparing for the 
successful implementation of trade-related agreements.” The scheduled completion of this joint 
exercise was December 2002. However, the author has been unable to obtain information about the 
progress of this project; cf. http://www.undp.org.vn/undp/prog/profile/eng/gov/vie01004.htm for 
downloading the official project document. 
119 Moreover, quantitative restrictions on products on which members receive CEPT concession as well 
as other NTBs have to be eliminated (maximum time frame five years). 
120 In addition, as announced by the ASEAN Leaders at their Third Informal Summit on 28 November 
1999, import tariffs of products in the Inclusion List (IL) would be reduced to zero percent by 2010 for 
the original six members, and by 2015 for the new members. 
121 Products in the IL undergo tariff rate reductions until the agreed limit of 0-5 percent is reached. TEL 
items comprise products which are shielded for a temporary period of time; they have to be transferred 
to the IL later. The SL contains unprocessed agricultural products for which tariff reduction 
commitments (as well as the phasing out of QR’s and other NTBs) are due by 2010 (for original AFTA 
members and by 2013 for Vietnam). Products under GE List are – in conformity with GATT Article 
XX - permanently excluded from liberalization commitments under CEPT.   
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67.76  12.12  3.14  0.82  83,83 
Source: ASEAN Secretariat, 2001, own calculations. 
 
Compared with the situation a few years ago, Vietnam has already come a long way in 
increasing openness under AFTA/CEPT. To implement commitments entered into, 
Vietnam has reduced tariffs for almost 85 percent of all products by the end of 2001. In 
the last of four equal installments the remaining 757 items will be transferred from the 
Temporary Exclusion List to the Inclusion List on 1 January 2003. Then, about 96 
percent of all items in the tariff regime will have been reduced (see Table 1).  
 
Table 2:  Vietnam’s published simple average tariff rates under CEPT (1996-2006) 
0 
1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006 
Inclusion List  
7.0 
6.8  5.8  5.6  4.7  3.9  3.8  2.8  2.6  2.5  2.3 
Temporary 
Exclusion List  
19.9  19.9  19.9  19.9  19.8  19.6  19.4  17.5  13.4  8.9  3.9 
Total  12.7  12.6  12.1  11.9  11.4  10.9  10.7  9.3  7.4  5.3  3.0 
Source: Ministry of Finance, 2001. 
 
An accelerated tariff reduction will be implemented from 2003 onwards (Table 2). 
Then, the simple average tariff r ate will descend rapidly from 9.3 to 3.0 percent,   43 
covering also many items which are currently produced in Vietnam. For many years 
Vietnam listed only those items in the Inclusion List that were not produced 
domestically. Correspondingly, the Temporary Exclusion List has contained most 
products with a strong domestic production base. Moreover, Vietnam’s General 
Exception List appears not to comply with Article XX of GATT (restricting exceptions 
to the protection of national security, human, animal or plant  life, public morals etc.), 
since it includes items such as fuels, broadcasting and receiving equipment, 
switchboards, used consumer goods, scrap, vehicles with less than 16 seats, etc., i.e. 
again items where Vietnam has strong protection and revenue objectives.  
This approach towards fulfilling AFTA/CEPT obligations has fostered domestic 
enterprises’ illusion that liberalization commitments are abstract and that 
implementation would be protracted by the government for a long time to come, i.e. as 
long as possible. Being published as late as June 2001, Vietnam’s obligations122 were 
administered in a very opaque way by the Ministry of Trade for many years and 
shielded particular, short-term interests of some vested interest groups. Consequently, 
domestic enterprise chances to prepare for stiffer competition from Asian neighbor 
states to secure their current level of employment are substantially reduced. Although it 
is rather an academic remark, a deliberate and comprehensive enterprise preparation 
program123 for p otentially competitive sectors, launched years ago (!), would have 
contributed much to r educe the risk of economic and social problems developing 
because of rising unemployment in the wake of trade liberalization.  
8.2  BTA  
The US-Vietnam Bilateral Trade Agreement (BTA) became effective on 10 December 
2001 and involves many legal and technical procedures, which will anticipate core 
WTO obligations. The BTA, which is the most comprehensive bilateral trade agreement 
                                                 
122 Vietnam’s implementation schedule for AFTA/CEPT o bligations (2001) can be found and 
downloaded as Excel file under 
http://www.aseansec.org/economic/afta/2001_cept_package/vietnam_2001.htm. 
123 Practical advise in accounting / daily business operations, human resource management, market 
research, exploration of new distribution channels, marketing issues etc.  
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so far negotiated by USTR, covers WTO disciplines on trade in goods, trade in services 
and trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights, various international 
conventions on intellectual property124 and the Basic Telecom Reference Paper 
negotiated under WTO.125  
Obligations under market access provisions126 include to:  
•  Guarantee MFN and national treatment to US goods and services upon 
ratification (including customs levies & charges, internal taxes, transportation, 
distribution and storage of products etc.). 
•  Eliminate import quotas over a period of 3 to 7 years after ratification. 
•  Tariff cuts of 30-50 percent on approximately 250 products, most of them 
agricultural goods, (phase-in period of up to 6 years).  
•  Abolish import-licensing requirements (gradually over 3 to 6 years). 
•  Apply WTO provisions on customs valuation, technical standards & SPS 
measures.  
•  Allow investment in service industries, including legal services, accounting, tax-
counseling, integrated engineering, computer software, advertising, management 
consulting, telecommunication, construction, distribution, education, insurance, 
banking, and tourism. 
•  US investment is facilitated by protection against expropriation, clear provision 
on profit repatriation, eliminating the 30 percent minimum capital requirement 
for US stakes in a joint venture, and phasing out TRIM-inconsistent provisions. 
Moreover, the BTA calls for a comprehensive review and - at least partly - overhaul of 
Vietnam’s trade regime and legal system. Thus, the U.S.-Vietnam Trade Council 
                                                 
124 Berne Convention (Literary and Artistic Works), Paris Convention (Industrial Property), New 
Varieties of Plant Protection, Brussels Convention (Satellite Signals), Geneva Convention 
(Phonograms).  
125 For a summary of the BTA see http://www.usvtc.org/BTA/CRS%20Vietnam%20BTA.21jun01.pdf. 
126 Granted to US companies and service providers by Vietnam. For US concessions please refer to the 
BTA under http://www.usvtc.org/BTA/usvtc_bta_text.htm.   45 
(USVTC)127 has devoted much effort to catalogue legislation and regulatory efforts 
made in areas relating to the BTA and in accordance with international trade and 
investment standards. Additionally, detailed roadmaps have been developed under 
USVTC patronage by Baker & McKenzie Vietnam to make the BTA work. The last one 
of March 2001 lists in six chapters128 on more than 200 pages the laws and/or 
regulations per commitment that might require adjustments for being in compliance 
with the BTA.129 Although the US legal experts do not indicate in detail interlinkages 
with other non-trade reform sectors, their BTA roadmap is a deliberate approximation 
for indicating adjustment requirements for full WTO membership.  
8.3  APEC 
APEC’s main agenda is to dismantle trade and investment barriers among all members 
by 2020.130 Regularly updated Individual Action Plans (IAPs) describe voluntary and 
not-binding action APEC members expect to take in order to reach that goal. IAPs 
contain each country's proposed individual liberalization steps in fifteen areas.131 
Vietnam has become an official member of APEC in November 1998, thus committed 
to advance unilaterally liberalization measures by formulating and implementing IAPs. 
Up to now five IAPs have been forwarded to the APEC Secretariat in Singapore.132 
They are more specific on near-term actions than on the long-term view of trade 
liberalization. Since membership obligations under WTO will be by far more 
demanding and the time-frame for APEC is well beyond even any pessimistic forecast 
                                                 
127 The USVTC is a non-profit organization founded in 1989. Chairman of the Board of Directors is now 
the former US Ambassador to Vietnam, Mr. P. Peterson. 
128 (1) Trade in Goods, (2) Intellectual Property, (3) Trade in Services, (4) Investment Relations, (5) 
Business facilitation, (6) Transparency and Right to Appeal. 
129 Please refer to http://www.usvtc.org/BTA/Roadmaps/Roadmap%20Descriptions.htm. 
130 2010 for developed member countries. 
131 Tariffs, non-tariff trade issues, services, investment, standards and conformance, customs procedures, 
intellectual property rights, competition policy, government procurement, deregulation, rules of origin, 
dispute mediation, mobility of business people, and information gathering and analysis. For more 
information on IAP format guidelines see http://www.apecsec.org.sg (under About APEC/Policies & 
Procedures). 
132 The last one in 2002.  
 
46 
of Vietnam’s date of accession to the WTO, MoT designates  – for understandable 
reasons – rather limited human resources to the APEC process.133  
8.4  Interjection 
Fundamentally and for economic-technical reasons it would make much sense for 
Vietnam to become full WTO member before the core obligations under AFTA/CEPT 
and the US BTA are to be met. The burden of administering the various and fairly 
complex market access commitments would be alleviated somewhat by an early WTO 
accession in late 2004 / spring 2005. Moreover, the “entrance fee” Vietnam must be 
prepared to pay, might be somewhat lower than for a late accession, after the conclusion 
of the Doha Round134 but will be, nevertheless, well above the aggregated market 
access commitments of AFTA and US BTA135.  
Although an early WTO accession would (probably) be beneficial for FDI inflows 
(WTO membership being a sign of commitment to reform136) it remains unclear 
whether all the potential advantages of WTO membership will emerge immediately 
after accession.137 Their appearance depends first and foremost of the overall 
management of Vietnam’s reform process. If integration policy is continued to be 
administered like it is now – with no clear responsibilities in trade policy formulation 
                                                 
133 Moreover, IAP commitments are not binding (i.e. there is no mechanism for sanctions in case of non-
compliance). 
134 However, the most important goal of that approach would seem to be to avoid “double payment” in 
market access commitments on goods and services, as well as additional reductions of domestic 
support in agriculture (provided such are agreed in the multilateral negotiations). 
135 Bilateral negotiations with  current WTO members will result in a greater opening up of the 
Vietnamese economy; see next chapter for more details. 
136 Empirical evidence, however, indicates no distinctive correlation between WTO membership and 
FDI inflows. Positive evidence, apart from  China, is given in the case of Bulgaria where FDI inflows 
increased more than 460 % in the year after acceding to the WTO. The Kyrgyz Republic, in contrast, 
experienced the opposite: FDI inflows halved after accession (and dropped much further in 2000). See 
statistical annex to UNCTAD’s World Investment Report 2002. This indicates that WTO membership 
creates additional attractiveness for foreign capital inflows only if trade policy is mainstreamed into the 
broader national development strategy.  
137 One aspect which should be taken into faithful account is China’s accession to the WTO. Even in 
times when global FDI inflows are substantially reduced China still attracts FDI in increasing order of 
magnitude (see UNCTAD’s World Investment Report 2002). Since life is unpleasant in close vicinity 
to a “black (FDI) hole”, potentially positive effects of WTO membership on FDI inflows in Vietnam 
may be outshone by the neighbors’ huge appetite on foreign investment capital.    47 
assigned to relevant domestic stakeholders138, lack of political will, prevailing 
bureaucratic intransigence and obstruction etc.  – it is not advisable to stick to the 
announced timeframe of a WTO entry by early 2005. But if political-ideological 
reservations are left aside and national resources are pooled and administered in a 
rational, coherent and comprehensive way, a deliberate integration policy might well 
have similar stimulating effects as the first batch of economic reforms initiated between 
1987 and 1993.  
Again, implementing integration commitments under regional or bilateral trade 
agreements ahead of schedule by an anticipated WTO accession is - first and foremost - 
a question of political will and thus implies the firm, comprehensive and immediate 
addressing of several pressing reform issues. Trade liberalization needs to be 
accompanied by supportive policies in such areas as export capacity formation, 
modernizing the legal system, SOE reform, providing a level playing field for the 
private sector, exchange rate management, but also by predictable governmental 
policies. Liberalization could thus be called one of the important goals of integration 
into the global economy, but it should be pursued with discretion and discernment. 
 
 
9  Bargaining strategy  
The negotiation process for full WTO membership is carried out on two different levels: 
the multilateral and the bilateral one. For the multilateral level clear provisions are 
available.139 There is a reasonable amount of transparency and, on the whole, one could 
say that this process helps acceding member countries to align their economy with the 
requirements of WTO membership. The bilateral process is somewhat different. Here, 
the applicant is confronted with two tracks of negotiations: (1) commitments on tariffs  
                                                 
138 That is to say a deliberate division of labor between ministries, business representatives, coordinating 
bodies such as the NCIEC etc. 
139 The organization and pursuit of the accession negotiations in each Working Party follow a well-
established pattern based on procedures set out in a note by the Secretariat, WT/ACC/1 of 
24 March 1995. This document is available in an updated version of 21 December 2001 (pls. refer to 
document WT/ACC/10 for more information).  
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and on agricultural subsidies, and (2) commitments on trade in services. In both strands 
the applicant not seldom finds itself exposed to pressures to make concessions that may 
not always be in its perceived national interests.140  
In order to proceed with bilateral negotiations on market access in goods and on 
services an acceding country is required to submit a comprehensive “initial” tariff offer, 
usually arranged according to the Harmonized System (HS) tariff nomenclature141, and 
a corresponding - but in appearance somewhat different - offer for market access for 
trade in services. It should be noted here that bilateral negotiations are conducted on a 
confidential basis between the applicant and a WTO member. For advancing the 
accession process it is recommended to submit an offer first and to wait for specific 
requests from interested WTO members. After examining those requests, and by taking 
into a ccount the national (trade) interests of the applicant, a revised offer can be 
forwarded, followed by further liberalization requests. This process continues until both 
sides agree on the results.142 After bilateral negotiations are concluded with all 
interested WTO members, the bilaterally concluded concessions are consolidated into a 
single Schedule of Concessions (one for goods and one for services). The whole 
package is then submitted by WTO’s Accession Unit to the applicant’s Working Party 
for multilateral review and adoption. By the date of accession the applicant must extend 
agreed tariff concessions on a Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) basis to all WTO 
members.143 
                                                 
140 E.g. tariff reductions below an internally agreed level (protection of infant industries). Therefore it 
might help to examine the experiences of recently joined member countries with a similar economic 
structure. 
141 The HS nomenclature contains four digits level “headings”, six digits level “subheadings” which 
have been subdivided recently into eight digits subheadings to reflect national administrative and 
statistical requirements.  
142 Recent accession negotiations have provided evidence for a general trend of WTO members to push 
applicants to participate in sectoral tariff initiatives, in which involved parties aim at reducing tariffs to 
zero on a reciprocal basis (for instance the “Zero for Zero” Initiative, the Chemical Harmonization 
Initiative and the Information Technology Agreement (ITA).  
143 Procedures for trade in services are somewhat different since GATS permits member countries not to 
apply MFN-treatment in a given sector (due to regional or bilateral preferential cooperation / 
investment agreements). However, as mentioned above, MFN exceptions are for a maximum of 10 
years.    49 
So far, Vietnam has received more than 25 requests for bilateral consultations. Some 
officials have got excited about the total number of countries seeking vis-à-vis 
negotiations on market access. They perceive that bilateral negotiations correlate with 
the importance or “weight” of an economy in the multilateral trading system (bilateral 
negotiations as a yardstick for the power to make things go). But the matter is not that 
simple. The number of countries seeking bilateral negotiations144 correlates with the 
complexity of the negotiations and thus rather calls for a deliberate bargaining strategy 
and, moreover, excellent negotiation skills. Taking into account the limited experience 
of most applicants with international trade negotiations (respectively the severe 
restrictions they face on governmental capacities) fewer negotiation partners would 
rather f acilitate accession procedure and would ensure a bargaining result closer to 
identified n ational trade interests.145 Since bilateral negotiations determine the 
“entrance fee” of becoming full WTO member, the number of bargaining partners rather 
correlates with “unwanted” concessions.  
Moreover, the MFN principle, which still seems to be not fully understood in Vietnam, 
generally obliges applicants that any concession made bilaterally to another country 
must be extended from the date of accession to all other members of the WTO.146 This 
means that the preferential treatment of certain imports of individual trading partners 
will definitely end when the applicant has become a full WTO member. For instance 
balancing requests from Australia for tariff reduction for wine and for mineral water 
with similar demands from the EU by providing each trading partner with better market 
access (lower tariff) in one product will result after accession  – due to the MFN 
                                                 
144 During accession negotiations usually 10-30 WTO members (to which the applicant has established 
close trade relations) request bilateral negotiations. It is common knowledge that each country has got 
its own, very specific trade interests; e.g. New Zealand usually requests tariff concessions for dairy 
products and lamb meat. Chile, EU and Australia seek better market access for wine. Switzerland is 
known for its preferences for the domestic watch industry (besides other key products). Knowing those 
national “stakes” facilitates the preparation of bilateral negotiations and helps to avoid committing too 
much to early. 
145 Or put in another context: Would the fox be more fortunate about an increasing number of hunters, 
arguing that a shifter’s reputation increases with the number of huntsmen?  
146 The MFN principle is restated in several WTO agreements. There are, however, exceptions to the 
MFN obligation, e.g. under regional trade agreements (preferential market access), the General System 
of Preferences (GSP) of developed member countries for imports from developing member countries, 
temporary MFN exemptions under GATS etc.   
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principle – in the lowest bilaterally negotiated tariff for wine and for mineral water for 
both countries (as well as all other WTO members)!  
Consequently, before conducting bilateral negotiations the applicant must consider the 
desired maximum total level of market access for all WTO members.147 Only in a 
second step, the applicant’s government may consider to whom of its trading partners it 
offers (temporarily!) preferential market access concession.148 Whether the applicant 
can restrict the partner’s market access demands to the internally agreed level is, 
however, another story. 
Thus bilateral market access negotiations call for a deliberate bargaining strategy. The 
applicant must, first and foremost, identify and consider his own needs as well as those 
of all (!) potential negotiation partners. Second, (realistic) bargaining objectives have to 
be formulated and prioritized. Developing an appropriate negotiation strategy requires, 
moreover, considering the “bargaining power”149 of each  negotiation partner. Since 
acceding countries must be prepared to receive requests for substantial cuts in their 
tariff levels when negotiating bilaterally with major trading powers, well formulated 
arguments - backed by substantive evidence and a sound long-term development policy 
objective – have proven successful in justifying the appropriateness of tariffs set by the 
applicant on key product items.  
No clear rules exist for conducting bilateral market access negotiations. There is no 
“provision” on country sequence150, simultaneous bargaining with more than one 
trading partner, the issue of sequential or parallel negotiation of concessions in goods 
                                                 
147 Taking into account possible reductions in governmental revenues and the applicant’s desire to 
temporarily protect some sectors and strengthen infant industries or strategic sectors. 
148 For reasons of foreign policy or to demonstrate a certain sympathy for the trading partner’s dominant 
industry. 
149 The bargaining power of a negotiation partner is determined by his (economic) size/weight, the 
access to ( human) resources and information, his negotiation experience, the team’s internal 
“cohesion”, the ability to hold out conflicts, the preparedness to take risks, by external support/allies, 
personal relations, offered i ncentive / exercised pressure etc. Consequently, high bargaining power 
helps to extract concessions from the applicant beyond his internally targeted level! 
150 That is to say to deal with the more important global trading powers first.   51 
and services, the place of negotiations151 etc. Customarily, the country sequence is 
according to the “first come first serve” principle. Therefore it is not advisable trying to 
put aside (at least temporarily!) the wish for bilateral market access talks of a minor 
trading partner since protracted bargaining might become later a major stumbling block 
for advancing WTO membership (thus providing the disdained counterpart with greater 
leverage at the end). Furthermore, offending trading partner’s rights to seek bilateral 
negotiation by pointing to already concluded market access commitments under 
regional trade agreements (e.g. AFTA/CEPT) is likely to backfire on the applicant by 
more demanding market access requests of the trading partner).  
Last but not least, political aspects of comprehensive market access commitments 
should not be ignored. One important motive for Cambodia to conclude its accession 
negotiations prior to the Ministerial Meeting at Cancun / Mexico152 is the resulting 
opportunity to extract commitments when Vietnam’s accession comes to the final 
stage.153 How to handle emerging delicate situations is more a question of diplomacy 
and political bargaining than of rational trade policy!  
Limited generosity is also to be expected from trading partners to which the applicant 
maintains – in general  – amicable foreign policy relationships. One example will be 
Korea. Although Korea is chairing the Working Party Meetings at Geneva and both 
countries have recently celebrated the 10
th anniversary of the establishment of 
diplomatic relations - during the past decade both countries have become increasingly 
intertwined in terms of trade and investment – Vietnam can expect little generosity from 
Seoul when negotiating bilaterally market access demands. It would be extremely 
surprising if Korea would not ask for comprehensive tariff concessions in – let’s say – 
HS heading 89, which comprises ships, boats and floating structures. In the past few 
years Korea has forcefully expanded ship building capacities, overtook even Japan in 
1999, and is now the leading global player in this market. Excess production capacities 
                                                 
151 In principle, negotiations can take place in the capitals  - either that of the applicant or of its 
bargaining partner - or in Geneva. Good arguments can be provided for all places, e.g. capacity of 
applicant’s Permanent Mission to Geneva, the accessibility of governmental officials, the making of 
advances to the trading partner etc.  
152 Which is scheduled for September 2003.  
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motivate g overnment support to open up new markets  – European shipbuilders are 
complaining for many years about distorted competition because of preferential loans, 
indirect subsidies and the Korean government’s repeated declarations of support given 
to highly indebted Korean shipyards. Since Vietnam is intending to d evelop (thus 
protect!) it’s very infant ship building industry - so that it can become a future engine of 
economic growth - tough bilateral negotiations are lying ahead.  
The EU might generate another example where commercial interests override 
diplomatic considerations. The decision of November 2002 to cease operations of the 
Multilateral Trade Policy Assistance Project, MUTRAP, by end of January 2003 can be 
read as an early warning about how jagged bilateral negotiations might become. Since 
not all members of the EU are pleased by Vietnam’s initial offer and the way how 
Hanoi progresses with WTO preparation, the rationale behind reducing technical 
assistance is – perhaps – to keep H anoi-based project staff out of the “line of fire”, i.e. 
Vietnam should be prepared to receive “US BTA-plus-plus” requests from Brussels. 
 
 
10  Institutional arrangements 
Without doubt institutional reforms are at the very heart of any WTO accession process. 
Implementing obligations under TRIPS, SPS, TBT (i.e. establishing or improving the 
institutional framework for administering commitments vis-à-vis the WTO community), 
fulfilling notification requirements154, bringing national legislation into conformity 
with WTO provisions etc. places a heavy burden on the acceding member countries that 
not seldom exceed the available institutional capacities. Thus, applicants are exhorted to 
                                                                                                                                               
153 Similar approaches have been or will be followed by Mongolia (vs. China), the Kyrgyz Republic (vs. 
Russia), or Armenia (vs. Azerbaijan).  
154 Notification requirements (information to the WTO  Secretariat about changes in trade-related 
legislation), have to be fulfilled under the following Agreements and Provisions: Agriculture, Sanitary 
and Phytosanitary Measures, Textiles and Clothing, Technical Barriers to Trade, Trade-related 
Investment Measures, Rules of Origin, Import Licensing Procedures, Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures, Safeguards, Trade in Services, Trade-related A spects of Intellectual Property Rights, 
Regional Trade Agreements, Balance-of-Payments Provisions, Trade Policy Review  Mechanism, 
Tariffs and Tariff Renegotiations, Quantitative Restrictions and Non-tariff Measures etc.   53 
rethink administrative reforms anew and may have to redesign the internal preparation 
and coordination capacities within the government (and beyond155).  
Since the author of this roadmap has comprehensively commented on the institutional 
dimension of efficient WTO membership156 negotiations, only some of the most 
important recommendations should be recalled here: 
•  The National Committee on International Economic Cooperation (NCIEC)157 
should be further strengthened beyond what is envisaged in Resolution No 7 of 
the Politburo. For putting the sometimes aired idea of upgrading the NCIEC to 
an USTR-like authority into action, institutional linkages to the MoT must be 
unraveled. Despite of its administrative advantages, the still maintained 
approach has contributed much to the perception that the NCIEC is not an 
independent institution to facilitate the cooperation among ministries and other 
governmental entities. The administrative separation requires the physical 
relocation to outside the MoT (preferably in geographic proximity to the 
Government/Prime Minister’s Office) as well as the strengthening of an own 
administrative authority for managing financial and personnel matters. 
•  The NCIEC is encouraged to establish an active link to the National Assembly 
by regularly informing NA committees and relevant key persons about the 
progress of WTO negotiations. Since accession  will impact heavily upon the 
business community as well as on the Vietnamese society at large, it is 
politically wise to establish amicable relations early on by informing 
comprehensively about policy options and the (sometimes very limited) leeway 
                                                 
155 Empirical evidence has shown that national WTO membership preparations should take into account 
the views and opinions of non-government stakeholders, such as the business community and - for 
increasing the legitimacy of the negotiation result - civil society groups (at least to some extent!). 
Otherwise (justified) complaints will occur when the commitments entered into are implemented. 
156 For instance in the report “Inter-ministerial Coordination During WTO Accession. Experiences of 
Selected (Transition) Economies and some Considerations for Vietnam” which was co-authored by 
Mr. Bui Xuan Nhat and Mr. Tran Ngoc Anh (both Prime Minister’s Research Commission, PMRC). 
The report was written June and August 2001 under the auspices of the German Federal Ministry for 
Economic Cooperation and Development’s (BMZ) technical assistance project “Promoting 
International Competitiveness of Developing Countries (WTO)".  
157 As set down in the corresponding decisions of the Prime Minister, the National Committee is the 




during  the market access negotiations. This move will facilitate subsequent 
NA’s support of the ratification procedure. 
•  The Vietnamese business community (SOEs, private domestic enterprises as 
well as FIEs) should become further involved in the negotiation process by be-   55 
ing allowed to communicate their views to the government, e.g. by sending their 
representatives158 to the frequent NCIEC meetings. A more visible participation 
of the business sector is highly desirable for defusing conflicting situations after 
accession is accomplished. 
•  A gradual and deliberate mechanism for arbitrating disputed integration issues 
between ministries must be developed and cultivated.159 This mechanism should 
be considered as a scale comprising three steps. Each step on the scale 
represents a qualitatively different level of arbitration capacity. Higher levels 
should build upon and add to the results elaborated at subordinate levels.160  
•  High-level arbitration capacities are important, but their use is not to be 
encouraged. If disputed issues can be solved directly among ministries on the 
technical level there is very limited need for a more centralized arbitration 
procedure on Vice-minister or even higher level. In order to avoid peak-load 
problems of the National Committee the domestic stakeholders should rely more 
on their inherent capacities to overcome inter-ministerial coordination and 
communication deficiencies on the important technical level. 
•  Sending line ministries’ staff on a job rotation basis to Geneva should strengthen 
the Permanent Mission. One or two pre-qualified experts with sufficient 
language capacity and direct WTO responsibility should have the opportunity to 
                                                 
158 Official representatives of relevant business associations (VCCI, important industry or service sector 
associations including (!) private sector associations). Individual enterprises or corporations should air 
their opinion though those formal channels only.  
159 Preparation for WTO membership is, in principle, subject to two levels of coordination, one political 
and the other technical. The objective of  political coordination  is to achieve consensus among 
prominent national stakeholders about emerging integration and bargaining issues. The subordinated 
(!)  technical coordination  process is the daily business of organizing horizontal communication 
beyond ministerial boundaries for preparing (!) the political coordination process. Technical 
coordination consists basically of nitty-gritty WTO issues whose discussion requires a very detailed 
and not easy to obtain knowledge of WTO agreements, provisions and practice. 
160 Principally, arbitration of conflicting situations and issues should be sought first on the technical 
level. Since most of the disputed issues are caused by a lack of information, regular communication on 
a technical level reduces the risks (and the costs!) of misperceptions substantially. Only (!) if mediating 
contradictory positions is not successful and no compromise can be reached, the controversial issue 
should be forwarded to the next arbitration level. A discussion during a NCIEC meeting on the Vice-
minister level (political coordination) might solve the problem. To this end each conflicting party must 
forward its perception in written form to the NCIEC chairman subject to a deadline fixed in advance. 
Provided that no conciliation is feasible at NCIEC level, the chairman should forward the case to the 
Prime Minister for final decision-making.  
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observe, experience and report (!) the dynamics of WTO’s daily business to their 
home ministries. For facilitating the integration into the Mission's flow of work 
their assignment period should last between six months and one year. Suitable 
candidates should be nominated by the line ministries. The final appointment 
must receive the approval of a NCIEC meeting at Vice-minister level. 
•  The information channel between Geneva and Hanoi must be streamlined. At 
present the Multilateral Trade Policy Department of MoT receives much more 
information because of its close (informal) links to the Mission’s staff, thus 
providing  the Department with an information lead over other domestic 
stakeholders. Since information monopolies are seldom beneficial to an 
integration process, a NCIEC meeting should confirm the obligation to share 
information across institutional boundaries and s hould, moreover, elaborate 
detailed guidelines for the information flow between the Mission and the capital 
(who should receive what kind of information and when? Who is responsible for 
the filtering?). An excellent example of efficient communication between the 
capital and the country’s Mission can be gained from New Zealand’s “Merlin 
Messaging System”. This system disseminates Mission’s reports via a highly 
encrypted communication link to one or more previously defined lists of 
recipients161 at the capital by a click on the right computer link. 
•  A “WTO Reference Center” should be established at MoT/NCIEC. The Center 
will enable interested officials of the government, business and academic 
communities to obtain trade-related information on the WTO internet site, in 
electronic form on CD-ROM, information and data in print as well as 
documents, thus contributing to the goal of raising public awareness and 
knowledge concerning Vietnam’s WTO accession. A second center should be 
set up in the South under the auspices of MoT’s HCMC office. Technical 
assistance for the establishment of the two centers could be provided (partly) by 
the WTO. Financial support for meeting the (very limited) infrastructure 
prerequisites could be sought from the (ODA) donor community. 
                                                 
161 Reports and information can be addressed to recipients within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade, to representatives of the business community or of civil society groups etc.    57 
•  Ensuring WTO conformity of decrees and bills is - first and foremost - the duty 
of the issuing line ministry.162 Therefore, the present WTO Working Groups on 
line ministry level should be encouraged and trained for developing sufficient 
capacity to fulfill this t ask.163 Essential for sustainable capacity building are 
sound career prospects164 and a clear mandate for the department’s staff to deal 
with integration issues on behalf of the ministry (i.e. firm anchorage within the 
ministry’s internal division of labor and practically no opportunities to bypass 
the WTO desk).  
The key difference between active and dynamic WTO members and those with a more 
“back seat”-oriented approach is usually directly linked to the performance of the 
member’s internal system of administration and bureaucracy. Thus, it is of crucial 
importance to consider capacities to coordinate between ministries and other prominent 
stakeholders.165 
Moreover, it is worth observing that the result of accession negotiations is built and 
depends on the institutional arrangements at the capital as well as in Geneva (where the 
country should be represented by an adequately staffed Permanent Mission). If there are 
weaknesses or shortcomings in the general system of domestic policy coordination, it is 
very likely that they will be exposed in the negotiations with WTO members - perhaps 
at considerable economic and political cost. Conversely, deliberate efforts to improve 
and u pgrade institutional arrangements with a view to more effective management of 
external r elations is likely to have the added benefit of pointing the way towards 
strengthening domestic policy coordination capacities. 
                                                 
162 The Ministry of Justice has conduced a “conformity check” for the BTA, which has revealed a great 
number of legal documents which have to be brought in conformity with BTA provisions.  
163 In reference to article 2, section 3 of the Prime Minister’s Decision on establishing the NCIEC it is 
suggested that the NCIEC secretariat offers  - preferably in cooperation with appropriate training 
institutes - WTO courses which aim at raising the WTO–related knowledge of the bureaucracy. 
164 Training abroad, taking over of staff when an upgraded NCIEC becomes operational etc.  
165 Frictional losses, inappropriate information filtering,  unacceptable processing times, clogged 
coordination capacities, poor internal arbitration, low sense of responsibility, ritual behavior or little 
institutional flexibility – to name some but not all occurring problems - can only be reduced or 
overcome if stakeholders understand and accept the functions of the different “nodal points” within the 
national trade-related coordination network.  
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There is enough evidence to conclude that the performance of (trade-related) 
governance capacities is the main determinant of competent WTO-membership. In a 
well-managed system of government, there is a division of labor in coordination as well 
as in operational responsibilities. From this perspective it is more important to consider 
capacities and processes for coordination rather than the more conventional emphasis 
on structures.166 Since reaping maximum in benefits from WTO membership requires 
identifying and formulating domestic interests inside as well as outside the national 
government, ministries and other interest groups must overcome exaggerated 
institutional egoism and develop sufficient capacities for aligning divergent positions in 
order to achieve a negotiation result that above all serves the national interest.167 Those 
economies whose national stakeholders are making constant effort to optimize their 
pattern of internal communication and cooperation are rewarded by an increasing ability 
to place their views and positions on the global trade agenda. It is this very specific, not 
easy to obtain “comparative advantage”, which make some economies more successful 
than others in leaving their mark upon the multilateral trading system. 
 
 
                                                 
166 If coordination on the technical level is weak, seldom practiced, or perceived as a loss of institutional 
autonomy, too much of the workload of preparation and arbitration will fall upon top level 
coordinating institutions. Consequently, they will become overloaded and clogged with a large 
numbers of technical problems, which require detailed decisions. Thus the structural approach runs the 
risk of over-centralization and slow responses. This is an important weakness because WTO 
membership often requires quick action. 
167 The conventional top-down approach describes the way that policies are legitimized and authorized, 
rather than the way they are effectively managed in practice. In reality, no single ministry or central 
institution can exercise a m onopoly. Coordination is a collective process to which the expertise of the 
functional ministries as well as the overview of central institutions contributes. Coordination is how 
the efforts of different parts of the system mesh with each other, rather than how one part of the system 
attempts to control the rest. Therefore, effective coordination requires a clear recognition of the 
plurality of organizations (ministries and other bodies) and interest that must be involved in the 
preparation of WTO membership. It is an adaptive, networking process, rather than a hierarchical 
control process.    59 
11  Final Remarks 
This study has tried to present in a comprehensive way the scope of action necessary for 
advancing Vietnam’s WTO membership preparations. It has become obvious that 
institutional and (policy) coordination issues - enriched by the heated internal debate of 
the advantages and costs of membership – actually determine the pace of Vietnam’s 
accession. However, trade liberalization is no panacea. It is a means to an end. The 
cohesion of the reform process must be kept in mind. There is enough evidence that 
economies which do not have a clear definition (and understanding) of what belongs to 
whom - i.e. where property rights, in the broadest sense168, suffer from dysfunction  - 
are unable to perform successfully on the world market.  
The observations and recommendations that have been provided here are, however, only 
a first approximation to the complex issue of formulating a comprehensive integration 
roadmap. Understanding the WTO agreements and being able to act according to the 
rules of the multilateral trading system requires a long-term process of investing into 
human capital. Thus, trade-related technical assistance (TRTA) can help to acquire the 
necessary knowledge and to build up sufficient institutional capacities. For the efficient 
allocation of scarce resources, a systematic approach to identify own needs and suitable 
sources of supply is necessary.169 Addressing TRTA needs in a structured and 
transparent way will raise the overall confidence in the work of the government and 
give a clear indication of the intention to derive benefits from the full participation in 
the global trade body. 
                                                 
168 Ownership rights and obligations, division of labor between administrative authorities on macro, 
meso and micro level, autonomy of legal authorities (separation of powers) etc. Basically, the 
transition towards market economy should be considered as a process of redefining and strengthening 
property rights. 
169 Please refer to Uwe Schmidt: The Institutional Dimension of WTO Accession. Observations and 
Practical Guidelines for Improving National Trade-related Governance Capacities, INEF Report No. 
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